CVE-2026-118670 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf. A fix is available for @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OHIF Viewers: DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting (XSS) through MIME type of document
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-118670.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf📦@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf📦@ohif/extension-dicom-pdfReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerability occurs when an attacker is able to inject their own JavaScript code into a web page's source, which is subsequently processed by the victim's browser. A common cause of this vulnerability is the failure to validate user-supplied data before displaying it within the vulnerable application without proper filtering. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker must input HTML code into a vulnerable parameter containing structures that trigger the execution of JavaScript. The DOM XSS variant occurs when user-supplied data is processed by a client-side script; if this data is not handled correctly by the script itself, it becomes possible to inject additional JavaScript commands.
Attacker model: Any actor who can get a DICOM object in front of a victim — email a .dcm
for local viewing, upload to a shared PACS, or operate/compromise a DICOMweb source.
Preconditions: Victim opens a study whose SOP Class is Encapsulated PDF
(1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1) and OHIF's dicom-pdf extension renders it (default in the
standard modes).
Taint path
Source — two attacker-controlled tags on the encapsulated-document instance:
MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument(0042,0012)EncapsulatedDocument(0042,0011) — the raw document bytes
extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js:15,20 reads the MIME tag with no
validation and passes it as defaultType:
const { SeriesDescription = 'PDF', MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument } = instance;
...
const renderedUrlParams = {
instance,
tag: 'EncapsulatedDocument',
defaultType: MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument || 'application/pdf', // attacker-controlled
singlepart: 'pdf',
};
const renderedUrl = dataSource.retrieve.directURL(renderedUrlParams);
Sink — defaultType becomes the Blob type in all three retrieval paths:
Local file (no server required): extensions/default/src/DicomLocalDataSource/index.js:120-131
directURL: params => {
const { instance, tag, defaultType } = params;
const value = instance[tag];
if (value instanceof Array && value[0] instanceof ArrayBuffer) {
return URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([value[0]], { type: defaultType })); // attacker MIME
}
},
DICOMweb InlineBinary: extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:40-44 →
platform/core/src/utils/b64toBlob.js:18
if (value.InlineBinary) {
const blob = utils.b64toBlob(value.InlineBinary, defaultType); // -> new Blob(..., { type: defaultType })
value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
}
DICOMweb bulk data: extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:52-55
return value.retrieveBulkData(options).then(arr => {
value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([arr], { type: defaultType }));
return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
});
Render — extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx:86-92
<object
data={url} {/* blob: URL whose stored MIME = attacker's MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument */}
type="application/pdf" {/* only a hint; overridden by the blob's own Content-Type */}
className={style}
>
Why it fires. A blob: URL stores the MIME type passed at new Blob(..., { type })
construction. When such a URL is navigated/embedded, the browser uses the blob's stored
Content-Type to choose a handler; the <object type="application/pdf"> attribute is a
pre-load hint, not an override. A blob created with type: 'text/html' therefore renders as an
HTML document, and because blob: URLs inherit the creating page's origin, any <script> in it
executes in the OHIF origin — with access to localStorage/sessionStorage, auth tokens,
and same-origin requests to the PACS.
Impact
Users using the applications. If the application is behind authentication then session can be stolen. If on the same DNS name some other applications are hosted, they are also impacted.
Patches
Fixed in @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf 3.12.18, 3.13.10 and 3.14.0-beta.36 (fix: https://github.com/OHIF/Viewers/pull/6228).
If you build OHIF from source, the fix first landed in tags 3.12.15, 3.13.7 and 3.14.0-beta.19.
Versions 3.5 to 3.11 will not receive a fix. Upgrade to a patched 3.12, 3.13 or 3.14 version.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf | ≥ 3.5.0-beta.0&&< 3.12.18 | 3.12.18npm install @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf@3.12.18 |
| 📦npm | @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf | ≥ 3.13.0-beta.0&&< 3.13.10 | 3.13.10npm install @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf@3.13.10 |
| 📦npm | @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf | ≥ 3.14.0-beta.0&&< 3.14.0-beta.36 | 3.14.0-beta.36npm install @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf@3.14.0-beta.36 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf to 3.12.18 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-118670 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-118670 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.