NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-29045 — hono

HIGHFix: honojs/hono@6a0607a

CVE-2026-29045 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-177 vulnerability in hono. A fix is available for hono — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Hono: Arbitrary file access via serveStatic vulnerability

Also known asGHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-29045.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.37%0.73%1.10%0.0%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

7Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
hononpm
102.8Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhonoall versions4.12.4npm install hono@4.12.4

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
honohono
< 4.12.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.12.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-29045 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary When using `serveStatic` together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. `app.use('/admin/*', ...)`), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization. The router used `decodeURI`, while `serveStatic` used `decodeURIComponent`. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (`%2F`) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path. ## Details The routing layer preserved `%2F` as a literal string, while `serveStatic` decoded it into `/` before resolving the file path. Example:
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-29045 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-29045: hono Path Traversal — Fixed in 4.12.4