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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-24398 — hono

MEDIUMFix: honojs/hono@edbf6ee

CVE-2026-24398 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.8) CWE-185 vulnerability in hono. A fix is available for hono — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Hono's IPv4 address validation bypass in IP Restriction Middleware allows IP spoofing

Also known asGHSA-r354-f388-2fhh
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-24398.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk-0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs28th percentile — riskier than 28% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.28%0.57%0.85%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

7Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
hononpm
104.5Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The IPV4_REGEX pattern and convertIPv4ToBinary function in src/utils/ipaddr.ts do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two components:

  1. Permissive regex pattern: The IPV4_REGEX (/^[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}$/) accepts octet values greater than 255 (e.g., 999).
  2. Unsafe binary conversion: The convertIPv4ToBinary function does not validate octet ranges before performing bitwise operations. When an octet exceeds 255, it overflows into adjacent octets during the bit-shift calculation.

For example, the IP address 1.2.2.355 is accepted and converts to the same binary value as 1.2.3.99:

  • 355 = 256 + 99 = 0x163
  • After bit-shifting: (1 << 24) + (2 << 16) + (2 << 8) + 355 = 0x01020363 = 1.2.3.99

Impact

An attacker can bypass IP-based restrictions by crafting malformed IP addresses:

  • Blocklist bypass: If 1.2.3.0/24 is blocked, an attacker can use 1.2.2.355 (or similar) to bypass the restriction.
  • Allowlist bypass: Requests from unauthorized IP ranges may be incorrectly permitted.

This is exploitable when the application relies on client-provided IP addresses (e.g., X-Forwarded-For header) for access control decisions.

Affected Components

  • IP Restriction Middleware
  • src/utils/ipaddr.ts: IPV4_REGEX, convertIPv4ToBinary, distinctRemoteAddr

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhonoall versions4.11.7npm install hono@4.11.7

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
honohono
< 4.11.7
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.11.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-24398 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Constrain what reaches the vulnerable code: limit the size and shape of untrusted input, isolate the affected component in a sandboxed or least-privileged process, and enable the platform's memory-safety mitigations (ASLR, stack protector, hardened allocator) so an out-of-bounds access is more likely to fail closed than to be exploitable.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The `IPV4_REGEX` pattern and `convertIPv4ToBinary` function in `src/utils/ipaddr.ts` do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls. ## Details The vulnerability exists in two components: 1. **Permissive regex pattern:** The `IPV4_REGEX (/^[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}$/)` accepts octet values greater than 255 (e.g., `999`). 2. **Unsafe binary conversion:*
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-24398 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-24398: hono — Fixed in 4.11.7