CVE-2026-22705 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-1240 vulnerability in ml-dsa. A fix is available for ml-dsa — see the affected versions and patch details below.
RustCrypto: Signatures has timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22705.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-22705 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
ml-dsaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.
Details
The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:
- UDIV/SDIV instructions: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.
The decompose function used a hardware division instruction to compute r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32. This function is called during signing through high_bits() and low_bits(), which process values derived from secret key components:
(&w - &cs2).low_bits()wherecs2is derived from secret key components2Hint::new()callshigh_bits()on values derived from secret key componentt0
Original Code:
fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem) {
// ...
let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32; // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
(r1, r0)
}
PoC
I do not have an exploit written for this, currently.
Impact
The dividend (r1.0) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.
Mitigation
Replacing division with constant-time Barrett reduction mitigates this risk. Since TwoGamma2 is a compile-time constant, we precompute the multiplicative inverse:
diff --git a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
index 559b68a..bb126ce 100644
--- a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
+++ b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
@@ -54,8 +54,50 @@ pub(crate) trait Decompose {
fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem);
}
+/// Constant-time division by a compile-time constant divisor.
+///
+/// This trait provides a constant-time alternative to the hardware division
+/// instruction, which has variable timing based on operand values.
+/// Uses Barrett reduction to compute `x / M` where M is a compile-time constant.
+pub(crate) trait ConstantTimeDiv: Unsigned {
+ /// Bit shift for Barrett reduction, chosen to provide sufficient precision
+ const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize;
+ /// Precomputed multiplier: ceil(2^SHIFT / M)
+ const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64;
+
+ /// Perform constant-time division of x by Self::U32
+ /// Requires: x < Q (the field modulus, ~2^23)
+ #[inline(always)]
+ fn ct_div(x: u32) -> u32 {
+ // Barrett reduction: q = (x * MULTIPLIER) >> SHIFT
+ // This gives us floor(x / M) for x < 2^SHIFT / MULTIPLIER * M
+ let x64 = u64::from(x);
+ let quotient = (x64 * Self::CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER) >> Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT;
+ quotient as u32
+ }
+}
+
+impl<M> ConstantTimeDiv for M
+where
+ M: Unsigned,
+{
+ // Use a shift that provides enough precision for the ML-DSA field (Q ~ 2^23)
+ // We need SHIFT > log2(Q) + log2(M) to ensure accuracy
+ // With Q < 2^24 and M < 2^20, SHIFT = 48 is sufficient
+ const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize = 48;
+
+ // Precompute the multiplier at compile time
+ // We add (M-1) before dividing to get ceiling division, ensuring we never underestimate
+ #[allow(clippy::integer_division_remainder_used)]
+ const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64 = ((1u64 << Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT) + M::U64 - 1) / M::U64;
+}
+
impl Decompose for Elem {
// Algorithm 36 Decompose
+ //
+ // This implementation uses constant-time division to avoid timing side-channels.
+ // The original algorithm used hardware division which has variable timing based
+ // on operand values, potentially leaking secret information during signing.
fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem) {
let r_plus = self.clone();
let r0 = r_plus.mod_plus_minus::<TwoGamma2>();
@@ -63,8 +105,9 @@ impl Decompose for Elem {
if r_plus - r0 == Elem::new(BaseField::Q - 1) {
(Elem::new(0), r0 - Elem::new(1))
} else {
- let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
- r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;
+ let diff = r_plus - r0;
+ // Use constant-time division instead of hardware division
+ let r1 = Elem::new(TwoGamma2::ct_div(diff.0));
(r1, r0)
}
}
See our blog post on how we avoided side-channels in our Go implementation of ML-DSA for more information.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | ml-dsa | all versions | 0.1.0-rc.3cargo update -p ml-dsa --precise 0.1.0-rc.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ml-dsa, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update ml-dsa to 0.1.0-rc.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22705 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-22705 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-22705. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-22705 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-22705 across crates.io dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.