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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-22705 — ml-dsa

MEDIUMFix: RustCrypto/signatures@035d9ee

CVE-2026-22705 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-1240 vulnerability in ml-dsa. A fix is available for ml-dsa — see the affected versions and patch details below.

RustCrypto: Signatures has timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition

Also known asGHSA-hcp2-x6j4-29j7RUSTSEC-2025-0144
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22705.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs6th percentile — riskier than 6% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.22%0.45%0.67%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀ml-dsa

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.

Details

The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:

  • UDIV/SDIV instructions: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.

The decompose function used a hardware division instruction to compute r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32. This function is called during signing through high_bits() and low_bits(), which process values derived from secret key components:

  • (&w - &cs2).low_bits() where cs2 is derived from secret key component s2
  • Hint::new() calls high_bits() on values derived from secret key component t0

Original Code:

fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem) {
    // ...
    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
    (r1, r0)
}

PoC

I do not have an exploit written for this, currently.

Impact

The dividend (r1.0) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.

Mitigation

Replacing division with constant-time Barrett reduction mitigates this risk. Since TwoGamma2 is a compile-time constant, we precompute the multiplicative inverse:

diff --git a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
index 559b68a..bb126ce 100644
--- a/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
+++ b/ml-dsa/src/algebra.rs
@@ -54,8 +54,50 @@ pub(crate) trait Decompose {
     fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem);
 }
 
+/// Constant-time division by a compile-time constant divisor.
+///
+/// This trait provides a constant-time alternative to the hardware division
+/// instruction, which has variable timing based on operand values.
+/// Uses Barrett reduction to compute `x / M` where M is a compile-time constant.
+pub(crate) trait ConstantTimeDiv: Unsigned {
+    /// Bit shift for Barrett reduction, chosen to provide sufficient precision
+    const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize;
+    /// Precomputed multiplier: ceil(2^SHIFT / M)
+    const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64;
+
+    /// Perform constant-time division of x by Self::U32
+    /// Requires: x < Q (the field modulus, ~2^23)
+    #[inline(always)]
+    fn ct_div(x: u32) -> u32 {
+        // Barrett reduction: q = (x * MULTIPLIER) >> SHIFT
+        // This gives us floor(x / M) for x < 2^SHIFT / MULTIPLIER * M
+        let x64 = u64::from(x);
+        let quotient = (x64 * Self::CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER) >> Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT;
+        quotient as u32
+    }
+}
+
+impl<M> ConstantTimeDiv for M
+where
+    M: Unsigned,
+{
+    // Use a shift that provides enough precision for the ML-DSA field (Q ~ 2^23)
+    // We need SHIFT > log2(Q) + log2(M) to ensure accuracy
+    // With Q < 2^24 and M < 2^20, SHIFT = 48 is sufficient
+    const CT_DIV_SHIFT: usize = 48;
+
+    // Precompute the multiplier at compile time
+    // We add (M-1) before dividing to get ceiling division, ensuring we never underestimate
+    #[allow(clippy::integer_division_remainder_used)]
+    const CT_DIV_MULTIPLIER: u64 = ((1u64 << Self::CT_DIV_SHIFT) + M::U64 - 1) / M::U64;
+}
+
 impl Decompose for Elem {
     // Algorithm 36 Decompose
+    //
+    // This implementation uses constant-time division to avoid timing side-channels.
+    // The original algorithm used hardware division which has variable timing based
+    // on operand values, potentially leaking secret information during signing.
     fn decompose<TwoGamma2: Unsigned>(self) -> (Elem, Elem) {
         let r_plus = self.clone();
         let r0 = r_plus.mod_plus_minus::<TwoGamma2>();
@@ -63,8 +105,9 @@ impl Decompose for Elem {
         if r_plus - r0 == Elem::new(BaseField::Q - 1) {
             (Elem::new(0), r0 - Elem::new(1))
         } else {
-            let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
-            r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;
+            let diff = r_plus - r0;
+            // Use constant-time division instead of hardware division
+            let r1 = Elem::new(TwoGamma2::ct_div(diff.0));
             (r1, r0)
         }
     }

See our blog post on how we avoided side-channels in our Go implementation of ML-DSA for more information.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioml-dsaall versions0.1.0-rc.3cargo update -p ml-dsa --precise 0.1.0-rc.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ml-dsa, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update ml-dsa to 0.1.0-rc.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22705 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. ### Details The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags: - **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values. The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is call
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-22705 in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-22705: ml-dsa — Fixed in 0.1.0-rc.3