CVE-2025-29779
Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing has Inadequate Fault Injection Countermeasures in `secure_redundant_execution`
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
postquantum-feldman-vssReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.8.0b2 and prior, the secure_redundant_execution function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | postquantum-feldman-vss | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for postquantum-feldman-vss. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of postquantum-feldman-vss has shipped for CVE-2025-29779 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2025-29779 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2025-29779. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-29779 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2025-29779 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.