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📦 GitHub Actions📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-12537 — run-gemini-cli

HIGH

CVE-2026-12537 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli. A fix is available for google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gemini CLI: Remote Code Execution via workspace trust and tool allowlisting bypasses

Also known asGHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-12537.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs12th percentile — riskier than 12% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.81%0.3%0.2%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

30other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@google/gemini-clinpm
488Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Gemini CLI (@google/gemini-cli) and the run-gemini-cli GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions.

Details

Folder Trust in Headless Mode

In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environments (headless mode) automatically trusted workspace folders for the purpose of loading configuration and environment variables. This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted folders in headless mode (e.g. CI workflows that review user-submitted pull requests). If used with untrusted directory contents, this could lead to remote code execution via malicious environment variables in the local .gemini/ directory.

To ensure consistency and user control, the latest update aligns headless mode behavior with interactive mode, requiring folders to be explicitly trusted before configuration files (such as .env) are processed.

As a result of this change, GitHub Actions and other automated pipelines that rely on the previous automatic trust behavior will fail to load workspace-specific settings until they are updated to use explicit trust mechanisms.

Tool Allowlisting under --yolo

In previous versions, when Gemini CLI was configured to run in --yolo mode, it would ignore any fine grained tool allowlist in ~/.gemini/settings.json (e.g. run_shell_command(echo) would allow any command). This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted inputs with --yolo (e.g. CI workflows that triage user-submitted GitHub issues where we recommend a strict allowlist). If used with untrusted content and a tool allowlist that permits run_shell_command, this could lead to remote code execution via prompt injection.

In version 0.39.1, the Gemini CLI policy engine now evaluates tool allowlisting under --yolo mode, which is useful for CI workflows that allowlist a few safe commands to run when processing untrusted inputs. As a result, some workflows that previously depended on this behavior may fail silently unless tool allowlists are modified to fit the task.

Impact

This impact is limited to workflows using Gemini CLI in headless mode. Any use of Gemini CLI in headless mode without folder trust will require manual review to correctly configure folder trust. This affects all Gemini CLI GitHub Actions. Users must review their workflows, and take one of two approaches:

1. If the workflow runs on trusted inputs (e.g. reviewing PRs from trusted collaborators), set GEMINI_TRUST_WORKSPACE: 'true' in your workflow.

2. If the workflow runs on untrusted inputs, review our guidance in google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli to harden your workflow against malicious content, and set the environment variable.

Patches

The folder trust and tool allowlisting mitigations are available in @google/gemini-cli version 0.39.1 and 0.40.0-preview.3. By default, the run-gemini-cli GitHub Action will receive and run the latest version of gemini-cli. However, if your workflow specifies a version of gemini-cli by setting the gemini_cli_version, you are encouraged to upgrade to one of the patched versions and audit the workflow settings that use Gemini CLI.

Credits

Gemini thanks the following security researchers for reporting this issue through the Vulnerability Rewards Program (g.co/vulnz):

  • Elad Meged, Novee Security
  • Dan Lisichkin, Pillar Security research team

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionsgoogle-github-actions/run-gemini-cliall versions0.1.22
📦npm@google/gemini-cliall versions0.39.1npm install @google/gemini-cli@0.39.1
📦npm@google/gemini-cli≥ 0.40.0-preview.2&&< 0.40.0-preview.30.40.0-preview.3npm install @google/gemini-cli@0.40.0-preview.3

Affected Products

2 products · 3 configurations
Application
gemini-cligoogle
< 0.39.1
1 version
0.40.0
Application
run-gemini-cligoogle
< 0.1.22
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli to 0.1.22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-12537 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Summary Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions. # Details Folder Trust in Headless Mode In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environments (headless mode) automatically trusted workspace folders for the purpose of loading configuration
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-12537 in your dependencies?

Find it across GitHub Actions, npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-12537: run-gemini-cli RCE — Fixed in 0.1.22