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🐧
🐧 Linux
CISA KEV · ACTIVELY EXPLOITED
CRITICAL severity

CVE-2025-39682 — Kernel

CRITICAL

CVE-2025-39682 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) CWE-754 vulnerability in Kernel. It is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-09-18) — treat it as actively exploited and patch now. A fix is available for Kernel — see the affected versions and patch details below.

tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

Also known asA-440544511ASB-A-440544511
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Oct 30, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Actively exploited in the wild

  • Confirmed by CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-18. Federal agencies were required to remediate by 2026-09-21.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA (KEV catalog and SSVC triage) for CVE-2025-39682.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
3.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.37%
Lower risk than most CVEs88th percentile — riskier than 88% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%1.41%2.82%4.23%0.0%3.3%May 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐧Kernel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Linux packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

Each recvmsg() call must process either

  • only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
  • one non-DATA record

If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.

Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length).

Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐧LinuxKernel≥ 6.0.0&&< 6.1.1496.1.149

Affected Products

3 products · 8 configurations
OS
debian linuxdebian
1 version
11.0
OS
linux kernellinux
≥ 6.13 && < 6.16.4
1 version
6.17
OS
simatic cn 4100 firmwaresiemens
< 5.0
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Kernel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update Kernel to 6.1.149 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-39682 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

A logic bug in the kTLS receive path mishandles zero-length records taken from the rx_list, allowing a mixed record-type sequence to slip past the per-recvmsg() type constraint and proceed to data processing. The fix initializes and checks the per-call content type (using 0 as “unset”) and bails out when a non-DATA…

Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, prevent module tls from being loaded. Please see https://access.redhat.com/solutions/41278 for how to blacklist a kernel module to prevent it from loading automatically.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2025-39682 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10kernel-0:6.12.0-55.37.1.el10_0RHSA-2025:16904
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernel-0:5.14.0-570.49.1.el9_6RHSA-2025:16880
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.2 Update Services for SAP Solutionskernel-0:5.14.0-284.144.1.el9_2RHSA-2025:19224
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.2 Update Services for SAP Solutionskernel-rt-0:5.14.0-284.144.1.rt14.429.el9_2RHSA-2025:19223
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 Extended Update Supportkernel-0:5.14.0-427.96.1.el9_4RHSA-2025:19104

Frequently Asked Questions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-39682 in your dependencies?

Find it across Linux, including transitive dependencies.

Actively Exploited: CVE-2025-39682: Kernel (Critical 9.8)