CVE-2024-31986 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) CWE-95 vulnerability in org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
XWiki Platform CSRF remote code execution through scheduler job's document reference
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-31986.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui☕org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui☕org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-uiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
By creating a document with a special crafted documented reference and an XWiki.SchedulerJobClass XObject, it is possible to execute arbitrary code on the server whenever an admin visits the scheduler page or the scheduler page is referenced, e.g., via an image in a comment on a page in the wiki.
To reproduce on an XWiki installation, click on this link to create a new document : <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/%22%3E%5D%5D%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20context%3D%22request/parameters%22%7D%7D%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%23evaluate%28%24request/eval%29/.
Then, add to this document an object of type XWiki.SchedulerJobClass.
Finally, as an admin, go to <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Scheduler/?eval=$services.logging.getLogger(%22attacker%22).error(%22Hello%20from%20URL%20Parameter!%20I%20got%20programming:%20$services.security.authorization.hasAccess(%27programming%27)%22).
If the logs contain ERROR attacker - Hello from URL Parameter! I got programming: true, the installation is vulnerable.
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed on XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.5, and 15.9.
Workarounds
Modify the Scheduler.WebHome page following this patch.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui | ≥ 3.1&&< 14.10.19 | 14.10.19org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui:14.10.19 |
| ☕Maven | org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui | ≥ 15.0-rc-1&&< 15.5.4 | 15.5.4org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui:15.5.4 |
| ☕Maven | org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui | ≥ 15.6-rc-1&&< 15.9 | 15.9org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui:15.9 |
Affected Products
xwikixwikiResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-scheduler-ui to 14.10.19 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-31986 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-31986 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.