CVE-2024-28246 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.5) CWE-184 vulnerability in katex. A fix is available for katex — see the affected versions and patch details below.
KaTeX is missing normalization of the protocol in URLs allows bypassing forbidden protocols
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-28246.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
katexnpmDescription
Impact
Code that uses KaTeX's trust option, specifically that provides a function to block-list certain URL protocols, can be fooled by URLs in malicious inputs that use uppercase characters in the protocol. In particular, this can allow for malicious input to generate javascript: links in the output, even if the trust function tries to forbid this protocol via trust: (context) => context.protocol !== 'javascript'.
Patches
Upgrade to KaTeX v0.16.10 to remove this vulnerability.
Workarounds
- Allow-list instead of block protocols in your
trustfunction. - Manually lowercase
context.protocolviacontext.protocol.toLowerCase()before attempting to check for certain protocols. - Avoid use of or turn off the
trustoption.
Details
KaTeX did not normalize the protocol entry of the context object provided to a user-specified trust-function, so it could be a mix of lowercase and/or uppercase letters.
It is generally better to allow-list by protocol, in which case this would normally not be an issue. But in some cases, you might want to block-list, and the KaTeX documentation even provides such an example:
Allow all commands but forbid specific protocol:
trust: (context) => context.protocol !== 'file'
Currently KaTeX internally sees file: and File: URLs as different protocols, so context.protocol can be file or File, so the above check does not suffice. A simple workaround would be:
trust: (context) => context.protocol.toLowerCase() !== 'file'
Most URL parsers normalize the scheme to lowercase. For example, RFC3986 says:
Although schemes are case-insensitive, the canonical form is lowercase and documents that specify schemes must do so with lowercase letters. An implementation should accept uppercase letters as equivalent to lowercase in scheme names (e.g., allow "HTTP" as well as "http") for the sake of robustness but should only produce lowercase scheme names for consistency.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | katex | ≥ 0.11.0&&< 0.16.10 | 0.16.10npm install katex@0.16.10 |
Affected Products
katexkatexDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for katex, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update katex to 0.16.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-28246 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-28246 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.