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Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2023-24622 — safeurl-python

MEDIUMFix: IncludeSecurity/safeurl-python#5

CVE-2023-24622 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in safeurl-python. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for safeurl-python — see the affected versions and patch details below.

safeurl-python contains Server-Side Request Forgery

Also known asPYSEC-2023-298
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-24622.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs47th percentile — riskier than 47% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.71%1.06%0.1%0.6%May 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍safeurl-python

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

In SafeURL it is possible to specify a list of domains that should be matched before a request is sent out. The regex used to compare domains did not work as intended.

Impact

The regex used was:

re.match("(?i)^%s" % domain, value)

This has two problems, first that only the beginning and not the end of the string is anchored. Second, that a dot in the domain matches any character as part of regex syntax.

Therefore, an allowlist of ["victim.com"] could allow the domain "victimacomattacker.com" to be requested.

This has lower impact since the usual attacker aim in an SSRF is to request internal resources such as private IP addresses rather than an attacker's own domain. But, in a case where SafeURL had specifically been used to try to limit requests to a particular allowlist, say for example a PDF renderer, the finding would be more severe.

Patches

Fixed in https://github.com/IncludeSecurity/safeurl-python/pull/5

References

Server-side request forgery (SSRF)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIsafeurl-pythonall versions1.2pip install --upgrade 'safeurl-python==1.2'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
safeurl-pythonincludesecurity
1 version
1.0
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for safeurl-python, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update safeurl-python to 1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-24622 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Description In SafeURL it is possible to specify a list of domains that should be matched before a request is sent out. The regex used to compare domains did not work as intended. ### Impact The regex used was: `re.match("(?i)^%s" % domain, value)` This has two problems, first that only the beginning and not the end of the string is anchored. Second, that a dot in the domain matches any character as part of regex syntax. Therefore, an allowlist of ["victim.com"] could allow the domain "victimacomattacker.com" to be requested. This has lower impact since the usual attacker aim in an SS
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-24622 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2023-24622: safeurl-python SSRF — Fixed in 1.2