CVE-2022-24738 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/tharsis/evmos. A fix is available for github.com/tharsis/evmos — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Account compromise in Evmos
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2022-24738.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2022-24738 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/tharsis/evmosReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Classification
The vulnerability has been classified as critical with a score of 9.0 (highest). It has the potential to affect and drain unclaimed airdrop funds from Cosmos and Osmosis eligible user addresses.
Disclosure
The attack requires advanced knowledge of the internals of the core and application packages of IBC, IBC relayers, the Cosmos SDK AnteHandler, and the Evmos x/claims module. The step-by-step attack is described below:
- An actor creates a malicious chain with a custom
AnteHandlerthat skips signature verification for transactions, specifically IBCMsgTransfer. This allows the attacker to impersonate any account by setting a customsenderaddress field of the IBC transfer message. - The malicious actor then connects this newly created chain via IBC to Evmos and fills the
recipientaddress from the transfer message with an address they control. - Once the IBC packet containing the Transfer data is relayed to Evmos, it is processed by the claims module IBC middleware. Which migrates the claim records to the recipient address, which is owned by the attacker.
- The attacker then performs two airdrop Actions, claiming up to 75% of the total initial claimable amount.
- The Actor repeats steps 1., 2., and 3. for every address that has unclaimed funds from the airdrop. This automatically claims 75% of the unclaimable amount.
- The malicious actor performs the final Action, claiming 100% of all the user funds.
- Then, the attacker transfers the funds to another chain with a DEX (Osmosis, Cosmos Hub) via IBC.
- Finally, the attacker withdraws the total amount in fiat through a centralized exchange.
Users impacted
No users have suffered the loss of funds as no malicious chains have been connected to Evmos.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
The patch involves defining a list of authorized channels for chains that are connected to Evmos via IBC. This restricts the chains that have the capability of migrating users' claims records as per the specification. By default, the authorized destination channels are "channel-0" (Osmosis) and "channel-3" (Cosmos Hub).
Please upgrade your mainnet node and validator to v2.0.1 ASAP.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
No, the fix for the critical vulnerability is state machine breaking. An upgrade procedure must be coordinated with the nodes running the network.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Claims module spec: evmos.dev/modules/claims
- Cosmos SDK documentation: docs.cosmos.network
- IBC documentation: ibc.cosmos.network
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the Core Team in Discord
- Open an issue in tharsis/evmos
- Email us at [email protected]
Thanks to the Core IBC team at Interchain GmbH for the secure disclosure of this vulnerability
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/tharsis/evmos | all versions | 2.0.1go get github.com/tharsis/evmos@v2.0.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tharsis/evmos, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/tharsis/evmos to 2.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-24738 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2022-24738 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2022-24738. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2022-24738 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2022-24738 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.