How severe is CVE-2022-24738?

CVE-2022-24738 has a CVSS score of 8.1/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2022-24738?

CVE-2022-24738 affects the following packages: github.com/tharsis/evmos (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix CVE-2022-24738?

Update github.com/tharsis/evmos to 2.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-24738 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2022-24738 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tharsis/evmos, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2022-24738 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is CVE-2022-24738 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2022-24738 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for CVE-2022-24738?

CVE-2022-24738 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 1.1%, placing it in the 65th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2022-24738?

CVE-2022-24738 is classified as Improper Authentication (CWE-287). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was CVE-2022-24738 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2022-24738 was published on March 7, 2022 and was last updated on October 28, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

HIGH severity

CVE-2022-24738 — evmos

HIGHFix: tharsis/evmos@2887025

CVE-2022-24738 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/tharsis/evmos. A fix is available for github.com/tharsis/evmos — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Account compromise in Evmos

Also known asGHSA-5jgq-x857-p8xwGO-2022-0348

Published

Mar 7, 2022

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 2, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2022-24738.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

1.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs65th percentile — riskier than 65% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Classification

The vulnerability has been classified as critical with a score of 9.0 (highest). It has the potential to affect and drain unclaimed airdrop funds from Cosmos and Osmosis eligible user addresses.

Disclosure

The attack requires advanced knowledge of the internals of the core and application packages of IBC, IBC relayers, the Cosmos SDK AnteHandler, and the Evmos x/claims module. The step-by-step attack is described below:

An actor creates a malicious chain with a custom AnteHandler that skips signature verification for transactions, specifically IBC MsgTransfer. This allows the attacker to impersonate any account by setting a custom sender address field of the IBC transfer message.
The malicious actor then connects this newly created chain via IBC to Evmos and fills the recipient address from the transfer message with an address they control.
Once the IBC packet containing the Transfer data is relayed to Evmos, it is processed by the claims module IBC middleware. Which migrates the claim records to the recipient address, which is owned by the attacker.
The attacker then performs two airdrop Actions, claiming up to 75% of the total initial claimable amount.
The Actor repeats steps 1., 2., and 3. for every address that has unclaimed funds from the airdrop. This automatically claims 75% of the unclaimable amount.
The malicious actor performs the final Action, claiming 100% of all the user funds.
Then, the attacker transfers the funds to another chain with a DEX (Osmosis, Cosmos Hub) via IBC.
Finally, the attacker withdraws the total amount in fiat through a centralized exchange.

Users impacted

No users have suffered the loss of funds as no malicious chains have been connected to Evmos.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

The patch involves defining a list of authorized channels for chains that are connected to Evmos via IBC. This restricts the chains that have the capability of migrating users' claims records as per the specification. By default, the authorized destination channels are "channel-0" (Osmosis) and "channel-3" (Cosmos Hub).

Please upgrade your mainnet node and validator to v2.0.1 ASAP.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

No, the fix for the critical vulnerability is state machine breaking. An upgrade procedure must be coordinated with the nodes running the network.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Claims module spec: evmos.dev/modules/claims
Cosmos SDK documentation: docs.cosmos.network
IBC documentation: ibc.cosmos.network

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Reach out to the Core Team in Discord
Open an issue in tharsis/evmos
Email us at [email protected]

Thanks to the Core IBC team at Interchain GmbH for the secure disclosure of this vulnerability

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/tharsis/evmos`	all versions	2.0.1`go get github.com/tharsis/evmos@v2.0.1`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

evmosevmos

< 2.0.1

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tharsis/evmos, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/tharsis/evmos to 2.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-24738 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ ### Classification The vulnerability has been classified as `critical` with a score of `9.0` (highest). It has the potential to affect and drain unclaimed airdrop funds from Cosmos and Osmosis eligible user addresses. ### Disclosure The attack requires advanced knowledge of the internals of the core and application packages of IBC, IBC relayers, the Cosmos SDK `AnteHandler`, and the Evmos `x/claims` module. The step-by-step attack is described below: 1. An actor creates a malicious chain with a custom `AnteHandler` that skips