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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2021-21283 — sticky

MEDIUMFix: flarum/sticky@7ebd304

CVE-2021-21283 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in flarum/sticky. A fix is available for flarum/sticky — see the affected versions and patch details below.

XSS in Flarum Sticky extension

Also known asGHSA-h3gg-7wx2-cq3h
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.43%0.86%1.29%0.3%0.8%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2021-21283 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘flarum/sticky

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

A change in release beta 14 of the Sticky extension caused the plain text content of the first post of a pinned discussion to be injected as HTML on the discussion list. The issue was discovered following an internal audit.

Any HTML would be injected through Mithril's m.trust() helper. This resulted in an HTML injection where <script> tags would not be executed. However it was possible to run javascript from other HTML attributes, enabling a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack to be performed.

Since the exploit only happens with the first post of a pinned discussion, an attacker would need the ability to pin their own discussion, or be able to edit a discussion that was previously pinned.

On forums where all pinned posts are authored by your staff, you can be relatively certain the vulnerability has not been exploited.

Forums where some user-created discussions were pinned can look at the first post edit date to find whether the vulnerability might have been exploited. Because Flarum doesn't store the post content history, you cannot be certain if a malicious edit was reverted.

Patches

The fix will be available in version v0.1.0-beta.16 with Flarum beta 16. The fix has already been back-ported to Flarum beta 15 as version v0.1.0-beta.15.1 of the Sticky extension.

Workarounds

Forum administrators can disable the Sticky extension until they are able to apply the update. The vulnerability cannot be exploited while the extension is disabled.

References

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please start a new discussion on our support forum.

If you discover a security vulnerability within Flarum, please send an e-mail to [email protected]. All security vulnerabilities will be promptly addressed. More details can be found in our security policy.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistflarum/sticky≥ 0.1.0-beta.14&&< 0.1.0-beta.15.10.1.0-beta.15.1composer require flarum/sticky:^0.1.0-beta.15.1

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
stickyflarum
1 version
0.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flarum/sticky, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update flarum/sticky to 0.1.0-beta.15.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2021-21283 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact A change in release beta 14 of the Sticky extension caused the plain text content of the first post of a pinned discussion to be injected as HTML on the discussion list. The issue was discovered following an internal audit. Any HTML would be injected through Mithril's `m.trust()` helper. This resulted in an HTML injection where `<script>` tags would not be executed. However it was possible to run javascript from other HTML attributes, enabling a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack to be performed. Since the exploit only happens with the first post of a pinned discussion, an attacker
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2021-21283: sticky XSS — Fix Available