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HIGH severity

CVE-2020-36436 — unicycle

HIGHFix: udoprog/unicycle@6a6c367

CVE-2020-36436 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-362 vulnerability in unicycle. A fix is available for unicycle — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Data races in unicycle

Also known asRUSTSEC-2020-0116
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs54th percentile — riskier than 54% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.42%0.84%1.27%0.3%0.8%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2020-36436 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,738 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀unicycle

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implemented Send & Sync for types PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>. This allows sending non-Send types to other threads and concurrently accessing non-Sync types from multiple threads.

This can result in a data race & memory corruption when types that provide internal mutability without synchronization are contained within PinSlab<T> or Unordered<T, S> and accessed concurrently from multiple threads.

The flaw was corrected in commits 92f40b4 & 6a6c367 by adding trait bound T: Send to Send impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S> and adding T: Sync to Sync impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iounicycleall versions0.7.1cargo update -p unicycle --precise 0.7.1

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
unicycleunicycle_project
< 0.7.1
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for unicycle, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update unicycle to 0.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2020-36436 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Constrain what reaches the vulnerable code: limit the size and shape of untrusted input, isolate the affected component in a sandboxed or least-privileged process, and enable the platform's memory-safety mitigations (ASLR, stack protector, hardened allocator) so an out-of-bounds access is more likely to fail closed than to be exploitable.

Frequently Asked Questions

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implemented `Send` & `Sync` for types `PinSlab<T>` & `Unordered<T, S>`. This allows sending non-Send types to other threads and concurrently accessing non-Sync types from multiple threads. This can result in a data race & memory corruption when types that provide internal mutability without synchronization are contained within `PinSlab<T>` or `Unordered<T, S>` and accessed concurrently from multiple threads. The flaw was corrected in commits 92f40b4 & 6a6c367 by adding trait bound `T: Send` to `Send` impls for `PinSlab<T>` & `Unordered<T, S>` a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2020-36436: unicycle — Fixed in 0.7.1