Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2020-11053 — oauth2-proxy

MEDIUMFix: oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy@0d5fa21

CVE-2020-11053 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Open Redirect vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy. A fix is available for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Open Redirect in OAuth2 Proxy

Also known asBIT-oauth2-proxy-2020-11053GHSA-j7px-6hwj-hpjg
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 11, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2020-11053.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.43%0.86%1.29%0.2%0.8%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2020-11053 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,738 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

As users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites.

However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters (eg. %0a, %0b,%09,%0d) the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided.

Patches

@rootxharsh and @iamnoooob provided this patch as potential solution:

From 4b941f56eda310b5c4dc8080b7635a6bfabccad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harsh Jaiswal <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:38:31 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Fixes redirect issue

---
 oauthproxy.go | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go
index 1e9bb7c..f8beb4d 100644
--- a/oauthproxy.go
+++ b/oauthproxy.go
@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {

 // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
 func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
+       matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^/\s+/|\\`, redirect)
        switch {
-       case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"):
+       case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !matched:
                return true
        case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
                redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)
--
2.17.1

This issue was also reported to us separately by @mik317 several hours later

The fix was implemented in #xxx and released as version 5.1.1

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxyall versions5.1.1go get github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy@v5.1.1

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
oauth2 proxyoauth2_proxy_project
< 5.1.1
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy to 5.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2020-11053 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop reflecting attacker-controlled destinations: resolve every redirect target against an allowlist of paths or hosts you own, prefer a server-side key over a full URL in the request, and reject absolute URLs entirely where the flow only ever needs a relative one.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact As users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters (eg. `%0a`, `%0b`,`%09`,`%0d`) the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. ### Patches @rootxharsh and @iamnooo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2020-11053 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2020-11053: oauth2-proxy — Fixed in 5.1.1