@zimmo/last_searchnpm

The package's preinstall hook runs index.js on every npm install. The script collects host identity data — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, process.cwd(), and the package name — and ships it two ways: (1) hex-encoded into a DNS subdomain resolved against *.d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live (an interactsh out-of-band canary), and (2) POSTed as JSON to the hardcoded bare IP http://172.201.213.59:9090/c. The package has no legitimate functionality — index.js is an exfiltration-only payload. The inflated 99.0.0 version under the @zimmo scope, combined with the "security research" description and recon-only payload, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape: if a build pipeline at Zimmo (or a misconfigured installer) resolves the @zimmo/last_search name from the public npm registry instead of an internal one, the attacker receives internal hostnames, usernames, and install paths as reconnaissance for a follow-on attack.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@zimmo/last_search' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

• The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.