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Platform›Supply Chain Security

The attack didn't start in your code. It started three dependencies deep.

Supply chain attacks bypass every perimeter defense you have — they arrive pre-trusted, inside packages your team installs willingly. O3 watches the entire chain: what you depend on, what depends on that, and what's running in production.

Secure your supply chain See how it works
Attack chain trace
Blocked at CI
Malicious package published

[email protected] — backdoor injected

Developer installs dependency

npm install → event-stream resolves

CI build pulls package⚡ Detected

Package included in production bundle

Container image built✓ Blocked

Malicious code in layer sha256:a3f…

Production deployment✓ Blocked

Blocked — SLSA provenance mismatch

Capabilities

Every layer of the supply chain. Defended.

Dependencies, builds, artifacts, and runtime — O3 monitors all of them continuously.

Full dependency graph monitoring

Continuous monitoring of your entire dependency tree — direct and transitive — with real-time alerts when any package in the graph is updated, removed, or flagged.

Malicious package detection (real-time)

Detects typosquatting, dependency confusion, protestware, and malicious code injection as packages enter your environment — before they reach a build or deployment.

Build integrity verification (SLSA L3)

Verifies that every artifact in your pipeline was built from source you control, on infrastructure you control, without tampering — SLSA Level 3 provenance built in.

Artifact signing and provenance

Signs build artifacts with Sigstore (Cosign + Fulcio) and attaches SLSA provenance attestations. Consumers can verify the artifact is authentic and unmodified.

Runtime supply chain anomaly detection

Monitors running workloads for supply chain attack signatures — unexpected network connections from package code, new executables spawned by dependencies, and process anomalies.

Incident response — trace an attack back to its source

When an anomaly is detected, O3 provides a reverse trace: which package introduced it, which dependency pulled that package in, and where in the build it entered.

The Threat Is Real

SolarWinds. XZ Utils. Log4Shell. Every major supply chain attack exploited trust. O3 removes the blind spots.

These attacks shared one pattern: the malicious code arrived through the normal software supply chain, pre-authorized by the teams that installed it. Perimeter defenses don't help. You need visibility into the entire chain — from package publication to production runtime.

See O3 supply chain demo
O3 detection coverage — notable attacks
SolarWinds SUNBURST (2020)Build

Build process compromise — malicious DLL injected into Orion build

Build integrity verification (SLSA) + anomalous binary hash

XZ Utils backdoor (2024)Artifact

Maintainer account compromise — malicious code in release tarball

Artifact signing mismatch + provenance chain break

Log4Shell (2021)Dependency

Transitive dependency — Log4j2 3 levels deep in most stacks

Full dependency graph scan — transitive detection at L3

event-stream (2018)Package

Package maintainer transfer — malicious code added post-transfer

Real-time malicious package detection + behavior analysis

FAQ

Questions,
answered.

Everything teams ask before rolling this out. Still stuck? Reach our team.

  • A software supply chain attack targets the tools, packages, build systems, or infrastructure that organizations use to develop and deploy software, rather than the organization's code directly. By compromising an upstream component (a package, a build tool, a CI system), attackers insert malicious code that arrives at the target already trusted and signed. SolarWinds, XZ Utils, and the npm event-stream incident are prominent examples.
  • SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts) Level 3 requires that builds are produced by a hardened, isolated build service with full provenance attestations, cryptographic records of what source was used, on what infrastructure, with what build steps. O3 integrates with Sigstore (Cosign + Fulcio) to sign artifacts and produce SLSA L3 provenance attestations, enabling consumers to verify that any artifact was built from the expected source without tampering.
  • O3 monitors npm, PyPI, Maven Central, RubyGems, and other package registries for malicious packages using multiple signals: known malware signatures, behavioral analysis of install scripts, typosquatting detection against your dependency list, maintainer account transfer monitoring, and cross-referencing with threat intelligence feeds. When a match is detected in your dependency tree, O3 alerts immediately, before the package enters a build.
  • The XZ Utils backdoor (CVE-2024-3094) involved a malicious contributor who gained maintainer trust over two years and injected a backdoor into the release tarball, the tarball's contents differed from the git source. O3's artifact signing and provenance chain verification would have detected the mismatch between the git-signed source and the release tarball, triggering an alert before the package entered any build pipeline.
  • When O3 detects an anomaly, unexpected network connection from package code, new executable spawned by a dependency, or provenance mismatch, it provides a reverse trace through the dependency graph: which package triggered the alert, which direct dependency pulled it in, which package manifest introduced that dependency, and when it first appeared in your inventory. This trace reduces incident response time from days to minutes.