@demica/sharednpm

Note: This report is updated by a verification record

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/shared at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

@demica/[email protected] declares postinstall: node canary.js postinstall in package.json, which fires automatically on npm install. canary.js issues a plaintext HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path /dc?... with query parameters including os.hostname(), the package name/version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. The installer's host identifier is disclosed to a third-party endpoint over unauthenticated HTTP without consent. The package self-describes as a 'dependency-confusion canary' and uses an inflated version (99.99.100) under the @demica scope to outrank a presumed internal package of the same name — the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape. Regardless of the operator's stated intent, any party that resolves this public package on npm install is beaconed to an attacker-shaped destination (bare IP, plaintext HTTP, no opt-out).