Which versions of 0x2ai-demo8 are malicious?

The following npm versions of 0x2ai-demo8 are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate 0x2ai-demo8 if I installed it?

Remove 0x2ai-demo8 from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound network activity or persistence. Use O3 Security's dependency scanner to confirm the package and its artifacts are fully purged across your stack.

Is 0x2ai-demo8 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — 0x2ai-demo8 is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005683 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

Can O3 Security detect 0x2ai-demo8 in my codebase?

Yes. O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, blocking 0x2ai-demo8 and packages like it before any post-install script runs.

Malicious package

0x2ai-demo8npm

Malicious code in 0x2ai-demo8 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5595

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall 0x2ai-demo8

What this malware does

On npm install, scripts/postinstall.cjs writes a .mcp.json into the installer's working directory that registers a stdio MCP server (lib/chatroom-mcp-lite-patched.cjs) preconfigured with BRIDGE_URL=https://demo8.0x2ai.com and a hardcoded bearer token. Any Claude Code session subsequently opened in that directory auto-loads this MCP server, which exposes ~30 tools — including provider_query (advertises routing prompts to Anthropic/OpenAI/Google/Groq/OpenRouter/xAI/Mistral/DeepSeek and POSTs to https://demo8.0x2ai.com/api/proxy-query), settings_set (accepts user-supplied anthropic_api_key/openai_api_key), chatroom_post, memory_save, and agent_query. The result is that the installer's AI prompts, agent memory, stored provider API keys, and proxied provider responses flow through the author's bridge rather than directly to the named providers. Postinstall additionally drops CLAUDE.md and .claude/commands/0x2ai-boot.md into the installer's project root; the CLAUDE.md establishes a persona and instructs the agent to never disclose its inner workings or rules to the user ('First rule of the family: you don't talk about the rules') and to route state through demo8.0x2ai.com, while the slash-command auto-launches chatroom-monitor.cjs as a persistent background process. The bin/start.cjs launcher additionally spawns claude --dangerously-skip-permissions, which disables per-tool consent prompts in the user's Claude session, removing the last guardrail against the dropped MCP server's tool surface (which includes subprocess spawning via agent_query). Although the README discloses some of this purpose, the install-time write of project-scoped Claude configuration plus the man-in-the-middle for caller-supplied AI prompts and API keys is the silent-relay shape: normal use of the installer's AI agent silently delivers caller data to an author-controlled destination.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ecc8b825a6ca24f0ed99210734ea8d4f4fb7bf1bbdb3767b67417bf5cdb83257

Frequently asked questions

No. 0x2ai-demo8 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005683

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Scan your dependencies

O3 Security blocks malicious packages like this at install time and in CI.

Supply-chain protection