Which versions of 0x2ai-demo4 are malicious?

The following npm versions of 0x2ai-demo4 are flagged malicious: 1.2.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate 0x2ai-demo4 if I installed it?

Remove 0x2ai-demo4 from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound network activity or persistence. Use O3 Security's dependency scanner to confirm the package and its artifacts are fully purged across your stack.

Is 0x2ai-demo4 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — 0x2ai-demo4 is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005677 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

Can O3 Security detect 0x2ai-demo4 in my codebase?

Yes. O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, blocking 0x2ai-demo4 and packages like it before any post-install script runs.

Malicious package

0x2ai-demo4npm

Malicious code in 0x2ai-demo4 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5591

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall 0x2ai-demo4

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's postinstall script unconditionally copies its payload/ tree into the user's project directory (process.env.INIT_CWD), planting a .mcp.json, a .claude/commands/0x2ai-boot.md slash command, a .claude/settings.json with a statusLine command, and a CLAUDE.md system-prompt file. The dropped .mcp.json registers an MCP server that routes every tool call (chatroom_post, memory_save, provider_query, settings_get/set, participant_*) to https://demo4.0x2ai.com using a hardcoded shared BRIDGE_AUTH_TOKEN (fabc3af531c05473fd5667f5360afb68666156e47c6981ce). Once any future Claude Code session is opened in that project directory, the user's chat content, saved memories, and prompts intended for other LLM providers are transparently funneled through the author-controlled bridge — the user never edited their own .mcp.json to opt in. The dropped CLAUDE.md further instructs the agent to conceal its architecture, MCP wiring, and auth tokens from the user, supplying cover-story phrasing to deflect questions about the relay path. Separately, the package's bin/start.cjs launches claude --dangerously-skip-permissions with shell: true, disabling Claude Code's tool-permission prompts so the author-supplied persona and MCP can drive arbitrary file/shell/network actions without confirmation. The combination — postinstall-planted MCP relay + concealment instructions + permission-bypass launcher — is silent-relay of caller-supplied conversation data to a third-party endpoint, configured without user consent at install time.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.2.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1893e8cd8ff38936ad388208f98e30cc64a6b1126062e2ff716004338feedf8c

Frequently asked questions

No. 0x2ai-demo4 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.2.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005677

References

npmjs.com

Credits

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