rclone serve s3: --auth-proxy without --auth-key authenticates nobody - full SigV4 signature bypassGHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c
CRITICALFix: rclone/rclone@90595f3GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/rclone/rclone. A fix is available for github.com/rclone/rclone — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/rclone/rcloneReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
rclone serve s3's handler chain, when --auth-proxy is configured, is (outermost first): authPairMiddleware -> proxyAuthMiddleware -> gofakes3's own SigV4-verifying handler.
authPairMiddleware parses the accessKeyID straight out of the incoming request's own Authorization header (entirely client-controlled) and registers {accessKey: ws.s3Secret} into gofakes3's shared credential store via AddAuthKeys, for EVERY access key any client presents - not just ones previously known to the server. ws.s3Secret defaults to "" whenever --auth-key is not set, which the --auth-proxy documentation (and the reference bin/test_proxy.py) presents as a complete, standalone authentication mechanism requiring no other flag - matching how it's used for serve webdav/ftp/sftp.
gofakes3's SigV4 verification then checks the request's signature against exactly the secret authPairMiddleware just registered for that same client-chosen key. An empty string is a valid HMAC key, so a caller can trivially compute a correct SigV4 signature for ANY access key ID of their choosing using an empty secret, and verification passes.
Crucially, the auth-proxy script never receives a real secret to verify against, for S3 specifically: Server.auth() calls w.proxy.Call(md5(accessKeyID), accessKeyID, false, r.RemoteAddr) - passing the access key ID itself as BOTH the hashed "user" and the raw "auth"/password fields. Contrast with serve webdav/ftp/sftp, whose proxy integration passes the client's actual typed password (see bin/test_proxy.py, which forwards it into a backing SFTP login for real verification). For S3, no independent secret is ever transmitted to the proxy script at all, so no script - however carefully written - can distinguish a legitimate holder of an access key ID from an attacker who merely picked the same string.
Net effect: with --auth-proxy configured and --auth-key not also set (the configuration the feature is documented to support standalone), SigV4 signature verification authenticates nobody.
Details
Vulnerable code (before fix):
func authPairMiddleware(next http.Handler, ws *Server) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
accessKey, _ := parseAccessKeyID(r)
authPair := map[string]string{accessKey: ws.s3Secret}
ws.faker.AddAuthKeys(authPair)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
PoC
Built and signed a request by hand (via the vendored github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/signer/v4) using a freshly-random access key ID never configured or returned by anything, with SecretAccessKey: "", against a real rclone serve s3 --auth-proxy <script> instance with no --auth-key set:
status=200
<ListAllMyBucketsResult>...<Bucket><Name>mybucket</Name>...
A fully authenticated, successful bucket listing, with zero prior credential knowledge.
Impact
Any network-reachable, unauthenticated attacker who knows (or discovers) that a target is running rclone serve s3 --auth-proxy without --auth-key can choose an arbitrary access key ID, sign a request against an empty secret, and be treated as an authenticated user by the auth-proxy script - reaching whatever backend that script resolves the chosen identity to. No credentials, prior access, or user interaction of any kind are required.
Fix
Refuse to start rclone serve s3 when --auth-proxy is set without --auth-key, rather than silently falling back to a signature check that authenticates nobody:
if proxyOpt.AuthProxy != "" && len(opt.AuthKey) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("serve s3: --auth-proxy requires --auth-key to also be set (SigV4 has no other way to verify a signature for a dynamically-proxied identity)")
}
Note this is a minimal fix for the zero-knowledge bypass; once --auth-key is also set, every access key ID still shares that one static secret for signature-verification purposes (a caller who knows it can request any identity from the proxy script) - a narrower, pre-existing limitation flagged for awareness but not changed here, since a complete fix needs the auth-proxy wire protocol to carry a per-identity secret for S3 specifically (a larger design change).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/rclone/rclone | all versions | 1.75.1go get github.com/rclone/rclone@v1.75.1 |
Affected Products
rclonercloneDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/rclone/rclone, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/rclone/rclone to 1.75.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c in your dependencies?
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