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GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp

MEDIUM

Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources

Also known asCVE-2026-21885GO-2026-4287
Published
Jan 7, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk17th percentile+0.20%
0.00%0.25%0.51%0.76%0.0%0.3%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹miniflux.app/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting /proxy/... URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response.

Details

  • Vulnerable route: GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL} (accessible without authentication, but requires a server-generated HMAC-signed URL)
  • Handler: internal/ui/proxy.go ((*handler).mediaProxy)
  • Trigger: entry content is rewritten to proxy media URLs (e.g., mediaproxy.RewriteDocumentWithAbsoluteProxyURL(...)), producing signed /proxy/... URLs.
  • Root cause: the proxy validates the URL scheme and HMAC signature, but does not restrict target hosts/IPs. As a result, requests to loopback/private/link-local addresses are allowed and fetched by the server.

PoC

  1. Run Miniflux 2.2.15 with default configuration (media proxy enabled by default: MEDIA_PROXY_MODE=http-only).

  2. Log in with any normal user account.

  3. Subscribe to a feed you control that contains an entry with an image URL pointing to an internal address reachable from the Miniflux server, e.g.:

    • <img src="http://<internal-target>/secret"> (Note: <internal-target> must be reachable from the Miniflux process/network; in containerized setups, 127.0.0.1 may not refer to the host.)
  4. Open the entry and locate the rewritten media proxy URL (/proxy/<encodedDigest>/<encodedURL>) in the rendered HTML/page source.

  5. Request the /proxy/... URL. Expected (vulnerable): Miniflux fetches the internal URL and returns the internal response (SSRF).

Impact

Type: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) via media proxy
Who is impacted: Miniflux instances with media proxy enabled (default configuration typically enables it for HTTP/mixed content handling).
Impact: attackers with a valid Miniflux account can fetch internal resources reachable from the Miniflux server (e.g., localhost services, private network services, and link-local endpoints such as 169.254.169.254), potentially exposing sensitive data.

Suggested CVSS (v3.1)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (Base 6.5)

If there any questions or issues reproducing this, please contact: [email protected]

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gominiflux.app/v2all versions2.2.16

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for miniflux.app/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update miniflux.app/v2 to 2.2.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (`GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}`) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting `/proxy/...` URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response. ### Details - **Vulnerable route**: `GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}` (accessible without authentication
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.