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GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq

LOW

GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) remote code execution vulnerability in ciguard. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

ciguard: SCA HTTP client reads response body without size cap

Also known asCVE-2026-44219PYSEC-2026-2410
Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍ciguard

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Both SCA HTTP clients (src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/osv.py and src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/endoflife.py) call payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode('utf-8')) without a maximum-bytes cap. A hostile or compromised endoflife.date / OSV.dev (or a successful TLS MITM) could return a multi-GB response, exhausting the ciguard process's memory.

Threat scenario

ciguard process memory exhaustion → OOM kill or system swap thrash. Realistic when ciguard runs in CI with a limited memory budget (typical: 4-8 GB). No data integrity or confidentiality impact.

Realism caveat: both URLs are hardcoded HTTPS, so this is a low-realism threat (HTTPS prevents MITM unless the attacker controls a trusted CA or hijacks DNS in a way that doesn't trigger cert validation). The unbounded read is structural defence-in-depth, not a directly exploitable bug today.

Patch

  • New MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 (5 MB) constant in both modules.
  • body = resp.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1) with overflow check returns None (caller falls back to stale cache).
  • 3 regression tests in tests/test_sca_rules.py::TestSCAResponseSizeCap.

Discovery

Found during ciguard's first self-conducted pentest cycle, 2026-04-26.

CVSS Scoring

  • CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L — 3.7 (Low)
  • CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N — first.org calc 3.1 (Low); GitHub's calc 6.3 (Medium). Vector is correct — choosing v3.1 as the structured score keeps the consistent Low rating across consumers.

Reproduction

Monkey-patch urllib.request.urlopen to return a fake 50 MB response; observe memory growth before/after the call. Pre-fix: process memory grows by ~50 MB. Post-fix: _fetch returns None, memory growth bounded to MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES.

References

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIciguard0.6.0&&< 0.8.20.8.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ciguard. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update ciguard to 0.8.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Both SCA HTTP clients (`src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/osv.py` and `src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/endoflife.py`) call `payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode('utf-8'))` without a maximum-bytes cap. A hostile or compromised endoflife.date / OSV.dev (or a successful TLS MITM) could return a multi-GB response, exhausting the ciguard process's memory. ## Threat scenario ciguard process memory exhaustion → OOM kill or system swap thrash. Realistic when ciguard runs in CI with a limited memory budget (typical: 4-8 GB). No data integrity or confidentiality impact. **Realism caveat:** both URLs a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.