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GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc

MEDIUM

Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.

Also known asCVE-2023-47122GO-2023-2332
Published
Nov 14, 2023
Updated
Aug 21, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk29th percentile+0.27%
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.87%0.1%0.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/sigstore/gitsign

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.

There is no known compromise the default public good instance (rekor.sigstore.dev) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.

Patches

This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399

Workarounds

n/a

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/sigstore/gitsign0.6.0&&< 0.8.00.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/gitsign. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/sigstore/gitsign to 0.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected. ### Patches This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399 ### Workarounds n/a ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ h
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.