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GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp

MEDIUM

OpenClaw exec approvals: safeBins could bypass stdin-only constraints via shell expansion

Also known asCVE-2026-28463
Published
Feb 18, 2026
Updated
Mar 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk6th percentile+0.14%
0.00%0.22%0.44%0.67%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
3.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

OpenClaw's exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of "safe bins" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running tools.exec.host=gateway|node with security=allowlist.

In affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (sh -c) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like head, tail, or grep to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as * or $HOME/... without triggering approvals.

This issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercised by default settings (default tools.exec.host is sandbox).

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.13
  • Patched: >= 2026.2.14 (planned; publish the advisory after the npm release is out)

Impact

An authorized but untrusted caller (or prompt-injection) could cause the gateway/node process to disclose files readable by that process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.

Fix

Safe-bins executions now force argv tokens to be treated as literal text at execution time (single-quoted), preventing globbing and $VARS expansion from turning "safe" tokens into file paths.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 77b89719d5b7e271f48b6f49e334a8b991468c3b

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set for the next planned release (>= 2026.2.14) so publishing is a single click once that npm version is available.

Thanks @christos-eth for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary OpenClaw's exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of "safe bins" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running `tools.exec.host=gateway|node` with `security=allowlist`. In affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (`sh -c`) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like `head`, `tail`, or `grep` to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as `*` or `$HOME/...` without triggering approvals. This issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercise
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.