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GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh

HIGH

RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links in argoproj/argo-workflows

Also known asBIT-argo-workflows-2025-66626CVE-2025-66626GO-2025-4223
Published
Dec 9, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
2 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk43th percentile+0.48%
0.00%0.36%0.71%1.07%0.1%0.6%Jan 26Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The patch deployed against CVE-2025-62156 is ineffective against malicious archives containing symbolic links.

Details

The untar code that handles symbolic links in archives is unsafe. Concretely, the computation of the link's target and the subsequent check are flawed: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/5291e0b01f94ba864f96f795bb500f2cfc5ad799/workflow/executor/executor.go#L1034-L1037

PoC

  1. Create a malicious archive containing two files: a symbolik link with path "./work/foo" and target "/etc", and a normal text file with path "./work/foo/hostname".
  2. Deploy a workflow like the one in https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf with the malicious archive mounted at /work/tmp.
  3. Submit the workflow and wait for its execution.
  4. Connect to the corresponding pod and observe that the file "/etc/hostname" was altered by the untar operation performed on the malicious archive. The attacker can hence alter arbitrary files in this way.

Impact

The attacker can overwrite the file /var/run/argo/argoexec with a script of their choice, which will be executed at the pod's start.

Affected Packages

3 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v33.7.0&&< 3.7.53.7.5
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3all versions3.6.14
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflowsall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 to 3.7.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The patch deployed against CVE-2025-62156 is ineffective against malicious archives containing symbolic links. ### Details The untar code that handles symbolic links in archives is unsafe. Concretely, the computation of the link's target and the subsequent check are flawed: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/5291e0b01f94ba864f96f795bb500f2cfc5ad799/workflow/executor/executor.go#L1034-L1037 ### PoC 1. Create a malicious archive containing two files: a symbolik link with path "./work/foo" and target "/etc", and a normal text file with path "./work/foo/hostname". 2. De
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.