How severe is GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc?

GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc has a CVSS score of 8.1/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc?

GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc affects the following packages: land.oras:oras-java-sdk (Maven). Ecosystems affected: Maven.

How do I fix GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc?

Update land.oras:oras-java-sdk to 0.6.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc in my Maven dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for land.oras:oras-java-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc was published on May 19, 2026 and was last updated on May 19, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

☕ Maven

GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc

HIGH

ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation

Published

May 19, 2026

Updated

May 19, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

☕land.oras:oras-java-sdk

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The pullArtifact methods in Registry and OCILayout use the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.

Details

Two call sites are affected.

src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java, pullLayer (reached from Registry.pullArtifact):

Path targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));
...
Files.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);

src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java, OCILayout.pullArtifact:

Files.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));

The annotation comes from the remote manifest. Path.resolve treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows .. segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. REPLACE_EXISTING overwrites files that exist at that destination.

The unpack branch of pullLayer (taken when the layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true) is not affected, because it dispatches through ArchiveUtils.untar / unzip, which apply outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget) after normalization. The non unpack branch and OCILayout.pullArtifact lack the equivalent check.

fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path) is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
☕Maven	`land.oras:oras-java-sdk`	all versions	0.6.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for land.oras:oras-java-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update land.oras:oras-java-sdk to 0.6.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `pullArtifact` methods in `Registry` and `OCILayout` use the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write. ### Details Two call sites are affected. `src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java`, `pullLayer` (reached from `Registry.pullArtifact`): ```java Path targetPath = path

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works