GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v
CRITICALGHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) CWE-522 vulnerability in github.com/rancher/rancher. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Exposure of vSphere's CPI and CSI credentials in Rancher
Real-World Exposure
github.com/rancher/rancher🐹github.com/rancher/rancherReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A vulnerability has been identified in the way that Rancher stores vSphere's CPI (Cloud Provider Interface) and CSI (Container Storage Interface) credentials used to deploy clusters through the vSphere cloud provider. This issue leads to the vSphere CPI and CSI passwords being stored in a plaintext object inside Rancher. This vulnerability is only applicable to users that deploy clusters in vSphere environments.
The exposed passwords were accessible in the following objects:
- Can be accessed by users that are cluster members of the provisioned clusters:
- When provisioning a new cluster with the vSphere cloud provider through Rancher's UI (user interface), Cluster Templates and Terraform on the object
provisioning.cattle.ioinspec.rkeConfig.chartValues.rancher-vsphere-cpiandspec.rkeConfig.chartValues.rancher-vsphere-csi. - On the object
rke.cattle.io.rkecontrolplaneinspec.chartValues.rancher-vsphere-cpiandspec.chartValues.rancher-vsphere-csi.
- When provisioning a new cluster with the vSphere cloud provider through Rancher's UI (user interface), Cluster Templates and Terraform on the object
- Can be accessed by users with privileged access to the clusters' infrastructure (host OS):
- Inside the
planfiles in the provisioned downstream clusters' filesystems.
- Inside the
Note: if you believe that the vSphere credentials might have been accessed by unauthorized users, it's highly recommended to change them, after updating Rancher to a patched version.
Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Credential Access for further information about this category of attack.
Patches
Patched versions include Rancher releases 2.8.9 and 2.9.3.
After updating your environment to one of the patched Rancher's versions, it's mandatory to execute this script that provides an automated way to mitigate any vulnerable leftover vSphere clusters' credentials within Rancher's local cluster. This script doesn't need to be executed in case you are installing a fresh and new environment.
The script will fetch all objects in Rancher's local cluster, loops through them, if the affected vSphere charts are present, then it extracts the username and password parameters into a secret in the fleet-default namespace for both with the appropriate annotation to synchronize them to the downstream clusters. Finally, it updates the cluster's chartValues to reference those secrets rather than existing plaintext values.
The script confirms on write operations, as well as backs up configurations of the cluster objects before operating so rolling back is simple.
To run the script, fetch the kubeconfig for your local cluster and run with KUBECONFIG=/path/to/kubeconfig.yml bash migrate.sh. The script is idempotent and can be run multiple times safely if you want to validate just one at a time.
Notes:
- The feature flag
provisioningprebootstrapmust be enabled after updating to one of the patched versions. This feature flag is also mandatory when installing a new cluster. - Rancher 2.7 release line is not receiving a backport security patch for this vulnerability. For users running Rancher 2.7 with vSphere provisioning and that are concerned with this security issue, the recommendation is to update Rancher to one of the patched versions by following the standard update procedure based on the 2.7 version that is being used. Refer to the release notes for the proper update process for 2.8.9 and 2.9.3.
Workarounds
Besides only granting access to Rancher to trusted users and not allowing direct access to untrusted users to the clusters' infrastructure, there is no direct workaround for this security issue, except updating Rancher to one of the patched versions.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the Rancher repository.
- Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | ≥ 2.9.0&&< 2.9.3 | 2.9.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | ≥ 2.7.0&&< 2.8.9 | 2.8.9 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/rancher/rancher. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/rancher/rancher to 2.9.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xj7w-r753-vj8v across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.