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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj

HIGH

LLaMA-Factory allows Code Injection through improper vhead_file safeguards

Also known asCVE-2025-53002
Published
Jun 27, 2025
Updated
Jun 27, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk59th percentile-3.19%
0.00%1.78%3.55%5.33%0.5%1.0%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍llamafactory

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A critical remote code execution vulnerability was discovered during the Llama Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the vhead_file is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious Checkpoint path parameter through the WebUI interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the vhead_file argument is loaded without the secure parameter weights_only=True.

Note: In torch versions <2.6, the default setting is weights_only=False, and Llama Factory's setup.py only requires torch>=2.0.0.

Affected Version

Llama Factory versions <=0.9.3 are affected by this vulnerability.

Details

  1. In LLaMA Factory's WebUI, when a user sets the Checkpoint path, it modifies the adapter_name_or_path parameter passed to the training process. code in src/llamafactory/webui/runner.py

    <img width="1040" alt="image-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8bc79e4-ce7d-43c9-b0fd-e37c235e6585" />
  2. The adapter_name_or_path passed to the training process is then used in src/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.py to fetch the corresponding value_head.bin file from Hugging Face. This file is subsequently loaded via torch.load() without the security parameter weights_only=True being set, resulting in remote code execution. code in src/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.py

    <img width="1181" alt="image-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6edbe694-0c60-4a54-bfb3-5e1042c9230d" />

PoC

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Deploy llama factory.
  2. Remote attack through the WebUI interface
    1. Configure Model name and Model path correctly. For demonstration purposes, we'll use a small model llamafactory/tiny-random-Llama-3 to accelerate model loading.
    2. Set Finetuning method to LoRA and Train Stage to Reward Modeling. The vulnerability is specifically triggered during the Reward Modeling training stage.
    3. Input a malicious Hugging Face path in Checkpoint path – here we use paulinsider/llamafactory-hack. This repository(https://huggingface.co/paulinsider/llamafactory-hack/tree/main ) contains a malicious value_head.bin file. The generation method for this file is as follows (it can execute arbitrary attack commands; for demonstration, we configured it to create a HACKED! folder).
    4. Click Start to begin training. After a brief wait, a HACKED! folder will be created on the server. Note that arbitrary malicious code could be executed through this method.

The video demonstration of the vulnerability exploitation is available at the Google Drive Link

Impact

Exploitation of this vulnerability allows remote attackers to:

  • Execute arbitrary malicious code / OS commands on the server.
  • Potentially compromise sensitive data or escalate privileges.
  • Deploy malware or create persistent backdoors in the system. This significantly increases the risk of data breaches and operational disruption.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIllamafactoryall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for llamafactory. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of llamafactory has shipped for GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A critical remote code execution vulnerability was discovered during the Llama Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the `vhead_file` is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious `Checkpoint path` parameter through the `WebUI` interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the `vhead_file` argument is loaded without the secure parameter `weights_only=True`. Note: In torch versions <2.6, the def
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.