GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj
HIGHLLaMA-Factory allows Code Injection through improper vhead_file safeguards
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
llamafactoryReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A critical remote code execution vulnerability was discovered during the Llama Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the vhead_file is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious Checkpoint path parameter through the WebUI interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the vhead_file argument is loaded without the secure parameter weights_only=True.
Note: In torch versions <2.6, the default setting is weights_only=False, and Llama Factory's setup.py only requires torch>=2.0.0.
Affected Version
Llama Factory versions <=0.9.3 are affected by this vulnerability.
Details
-
In LLaMA Factory's WebUI, when a user sets the
<img width="1040" alt="image-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8bc79e4-ce7d-43c9-b0fd-e37c235e6585" />Checkpoint path, it modifies theadapter_name_or_pathparameter passed to the training process. code in src/llamafactory/webui/runner.py -
The
<img width="1181" alt="image-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6edbe694-0c60-4a54-bfb3-5e1042c9230d" />adapter_name_or_pathpassed to the training process is then used insrc/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.pyto fetch the correspondingvalue_head.binfile from Hugging Face. This file is subsequently loaded viatorch.load()without the security parameterweights_only=Truebeing set, resulting in remote code execution. code in src/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.py
PoC
Steps to Reproduce
- Deploy llama factory.
- Remote attack through the WebUI interface
- Configure
Model nameandModel pathcorrectly. For demonstration purposes, we'll use a small modelllamafactory/tiny-random-Llama-3to accelerate model loading. - Set
Finetuning methodtoLoRAandTrain StagetoReward Modeling. The vulnerability is specifically triggered during the Reward Modeling training stage. - Input a malicious Hugging Face path in
Checkpoint path– here we usepaulinsider/llamafactory-hack. This repository(https://huggingface.co/paulinsider/llamafactory-hack/tree/main ) contains a maliciousvalue_head.binfile. The generation method for this file is as follows (it can execute arbitrary attack commands; for demonstration, we configured it to create aHACKED!folder). - Click
Startto begin training. After a brief wait, aHACKED!folder will be created on the server. Note that arbitrary malicious code could be executed through this method.
- Configure
The video demonstration of the vulnerability exploitation is available at the Google Drive Link
Impact
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows remote attackers to:
- Execute arbitrary malicious code / OS commands on the server.
- Potentially compromise sensitive data or escalate privileges.
- Deploy malware or create persistent backdoors in the system. This significantly increases the risk of data breaches and operational disruption.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | llamafactory | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for llamafactory. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of llamafactory has shipped for GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.