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MEDIUM severity

Keycloak phishing attack via email verification step in first login flowGHSA-xhpr-465j-7p9q

MEDIUMFix: keycloak/keycloak#40520

GHSA-xhpr-465j-7p9q is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) CWE-346 vulnerability in org.keycloak:keycloak-services. A fix is available for org.keycloak:keycloak-services — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-7365
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xhpr-465j-7p9q.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs20th percentile — riskier than 20% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.77%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕org.keycloak:keycloak-services☕org.keycloak:keycloak-services

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

There is a flaw with the first login flow where, during a IdP login, an attacker with a registered account can initiate the process to merge accounts with an existing victim's account. The attacker will subsequently be prompted to "review profile" information, which allows the the attacker to modify their email address to that of a victim's account. This triggers a verification email sent to the victim's email address. If the victim clicks the verification link, the attacker can gain access to the victim's account. While not a zero-interaction attack, the attacker's email address is not directly present in the verification email content, making it a potential phishing opportunity.

This issue has been fixed in versions 26.0.13, 26.2.6, and 26.3.0.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenorg.keycloak:keycloak-servicesall versions26.0.13org.keycloak:keycloak-services:26.0.13
☕Mavenorg.keycloak:keycloak-services≥ 26.2.0&&< 26.2.626.2.6org.keycloak:keycloak-services:26.2.6

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
keycloakredhat
all

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.keycloak:keycloak-services, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update org.keycloak:keycloak-services to 26.0.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xhpr-465j-7p9q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

To exploit this vulnerability, IdP must be configured in Keycloak and the attacker would require both a registered Keycloak and identity provider account. Additionally, an attacker would need to know the email or Keycloak username of the victim. Finally, the victim would need to accept the verification link within the…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Disable account review in the Identity Provider to prevent users from potentially modifying identity information. Disable the email verification step and use only re-authentication step.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-xhpr-465j-7p9q (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26see advisoryRHSA-2025:11987
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26see advisoryRHSA-2025:12015
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.0rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.0.13-2RHSA-2025:11986
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.2rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.2.6-1RHSA-2025:12016

Frequently Asked Questions

There is a flaw with the first login flow where, during a IdP login, an attacker with a registered account can initiate the process to merge accounts with an existing victim's account. The attacker will subsequently be prompted to "review profile" information, which allows the the attacker to modify their email address to that of a victim's account. This triggers a verification email sent to the victim's email address. If the victim clicks the verification link, the attacker can gain access to the victim's account. While not a zero-interaction attack, the attacker's email address is not direct
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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