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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm

MEDIUM

LibOSDP RMAC revert to the beginning of the session

Also known asCVE-2024-52288
Published
Mar 8, 2024
Updated
Nov 12, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk3th percentile+0.07%
0.00%0.21%0.42%0.63%0.0%0.1%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍libosdp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

  • Issues:
    • SCS_14 is allowed on encrypted connection (osdp_phy.c)
    • No validation for RMAC_I is only in response to osdp_SCRYPT (osdp_cp.c)
    • Couldn't find anything specific in the OSDP specifications indicating it is forbidden, I'm gussing it shouldn't be allowed according from the secure connection initialization flow (let me know if you think there is spec-rela ted change that should be done)
  • Attack:
    • Once RMAC_I message can be sent during a session, attacker with MITM access to the communication may intercept the original RMAC_I reply and save it.
    • While the session continues, the attacker will record all of the replies and save them, till capturing the message to be replied (can be detected by ID, length or time based on inspection of visual activity next to the reade r)
    • Once attacker captures a session with the message to be replayed, he stops reseting the connection and waits for signal to perform the replay to of the PD to CP message (ex: by signaling remotly to the MIMT device or setting a specific timing).
    • in order to replay, the attacker will craft a specific RMAC_I message in the proper seq of the execution, which will result in reverting the RMAC to the begining of the session.
    • At that phase - attacker can replay all the messages from the begining of the session.

Impact

Replay attack

Patches

This issue has been fixed in 298576d9214b48214092eebdd892ec77be085e5a

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIlibosdpall versions3.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for libosdp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update libosdp to 3.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

- Issues: - SCS_14 is allowed on encrypted connection (osdp_phy.c) - No validation for RMAC_I is only in response to osdp_SCRYPT (osdp_cp.c) - Couldn't find anything specific in the OSDP specifications indicating it is forbidden, I'm gussing it shouldn't be allowed according from the secure connection initialization flow (let me know if you think there is spec-rela ted change that should be done) - Attack: - Once RMAC_I message can be sent during a session, attacker with MITM access to the communication may intercept the original RMAC_I reply and save it. - While the session continue
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-xhjw-7vh5-qxqm: LibOSDP RMAC revert to the beginning of th… | O3 Security