GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3
HIGHHono is Vulnerable to Authentication Bypass by IP Spoofing in AWS Lambda ALB conninfo
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
hononpmDescription
Summary
When using the AWS Lambda adapter (hono/aws-lambda) behind an Application Load Balancer (ALB), the getConnInfo() function incorrectly selected the first value from the X-Forwarded-For header.
Because AWS ALB appends the real client IP address to the end of the X-Forwarded-For header, the first value can be attacker-controlled.
This could allow IP-based access control mechanisms (such as the ipRestriction middleware) to be bypassed.
Details
In ALB environments, AWS appends the actual client IP address to the end of any existing X-Forwarded-For header value. However, the previous implementation of getConnInfo() extracted the leftmost IP address:
address = xff.split(',')[0].trim()
If a client sent:
X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed-ip>
ALB would forward:
X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed-ip>, <real-client-ip>
Since the implementation selected the first value, the spoofed IP address was trusted. This affected applications using:
ipRestriction(getConnInfo, { allowList: [...] })
or any custom middleware relying on getConnInfo(c).remote.address for authorization decisions.
The issue only affects deployments using the AWS Lambda adapter behind an ALB. API Gateway (v1/v2) and Lambda Function URLs are not affected, as they use AWS-provided source IP values from requestContext.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker could bypass IP-based access restrictions by supplying a crafted X-Forwarded-For header. This may allow access to resources that were intended to be restricted by IP address.
Only applications deployed behind an ALB and relying on getConnInfo() for IP-based authorization are affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | hono | ≥ 4.12.0&&< 4.12.2 | 4.12.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update hono to 4.12.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.