GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp — soft-serve
Fix: charmbracelet/soft-serve@c147421GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp is a Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve. A fix is available for github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve — see the affected versions and patch details below.
In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serveReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.
Details
Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172, which calls pkg/backend/user.go:46. If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted ReadWriteAccess at pkg/backend/user.go:94.
The import command then passes the user-controlled REMOTE into pkg/backend/repo.go:102. In vulnerable HEAD, git.Clone(remote, rp, copts) is reached without validating that remote is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as $DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.
The relevant vulnerable flow is:
PoC
Configuration:
- Default local test configuration is sufficient.
- SSH must be enabled.
- At least two users are needed: one owner/admin and one low-privilege authenticated user.
Reproduction steps:
- Start Soft Serve.
- As an admin, create a private repo:
soft repo create secret -p
- Create a second low-privilege user:
soft user create user1 --key "$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY"
- Seed the private repo with secret content:
git clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret
echo 'top secret' > secret/SECRET.txt
git -C secret add SECRET.txt
git -C secret commit -m 'first'
git -C secret push origin HEAD
- Confirm the low-privilege user cannot access the private repo directly:
usoft repo info secret
Expected result:
Error: repository not found
- As the low-privilege user, import the server-local bare repo path into a new repo:
usoft repo import stolen "$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com
- Clone the attacker-controlled imported repo and read the secret:
ugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone
cat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt
Expected result:
top secret
Notes:
- The
--lfs-endpointvalue is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.
Impact
This is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.
Any authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.
Impacted parties:
- Operators hosting Soft Serve for multiple users or teams
- Owners of private repositories on the same instance
- Any deployment where untrusted authenticated users can use
repo import
Practical impact:
- Theft of private source code
- Disclosure of secrets committed to private repos
- Exposure of unreleased or internal projects
- Possible follow-on supply-chain risk if stolen code contains credentials or release material
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve | ≥ 0.6.0&&< 0.11.6 | 0.11.6go get github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve@v0.11.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve to 0.11.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.