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GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm

MEDIUM

wger: IDOR in RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig API leak other users' workout data

Also known asCVE-2026-27835
Published
Feb 26, 2026
Updated
Apr 15, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk17th percentile+0.22%
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.76%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍wger

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

RepetitionsConfigViewSet and MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet return all users' repetition config data because their get_queryset() calls .all() instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user's workout structure.

Details

wger/manager/api/views.py:499 and :518:

# VULNERABLE
class RepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    def get_queryset(self):
        return RepetitionsConfig.objects.all()

class MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    def get_queryset(self):
        return MaxRepetitionsConfig.objects.all()

Every sibling viewset in the same file correctly filters by user. For example, WeightConfigViewSet at line 459:

# CORRECT — how it should work
def get_queryset(self):
    return WeightConfig.objects.filter(
        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
    )

The same user filter is present on SetsConfig, RestConfig, RiRConfig, and their Max variants — only RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig are missing it.

PoC

import requests

BASE = "http://localhost"
headers = {"Authorization": "Token YOUR_TOKEN"}  # any registered user

r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json())  # returns ALL users' repetition configs, not just your own

r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/max-repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json())  # same — all users' max repetition configs

Registration is open by default. Sequential IDs allow full enumeration.

Impact

Any authenticated user can read other users' repetition and max-repetitions configs, exposing workout structure (slot entry IDs, iteration values, operations, step counts, repeat flags, requirements JSON). This is a broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability — the same class of issue as OWASP API1.

Fix: Add the same user filter used by every other config viewset:

def get_queryset(self):
    return RepetitionsConfig.objects.filter(
        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
    )

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIwgerall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wger. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wger has shipped for GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `RepetitionsConfigViewSet` and `MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet` return all users' repetition config data because their `get_queryset()` calls `.all()` instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user's workout structure. ### Details `wger/manager/api/views.py:499` and `:518`: ```python # VULNERABLE class RepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet): def get_queryset(self): return RepetitionsConfig.objects.all() class MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet): def get_queryset(self): return MaxRe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.