GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32
HIGHGHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in apollo-router. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Apollo Router Coprocessors may cause Denial-of-Service when handling request bodies
Blast Radius
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Description
Impact
Instances of the Apollo Router using either of the following may be impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability.
- External Coprocessing with specific configurations; or
- Native Rust Plugins accessing the Router request body in the RouterService layer
Router customizations using Rhai scripts are not impacted.
When using External Coprocessing:
Instances of the Apollo Router running versions >=1.21.0 and <1.52.1 are impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability if all of the following are true:
- Router has been configured to support External Coprocessing.
- Router has been configured to send request bodies to coprocessors. This is a non-default configuration and must be configured intentionally by administrators.
You can identify if you are impacted by reviewing your router's configuration YAML for the following config:
...
coprocessor:
url: http://localhost:9000 # likely different in your environment
router:
request:
body: true # this must be set to 'true' to be impacted
...
External Coprocessing was initially made available as an experimental feature with Router version 1.21.0 on 2023-06-20 and was made generally available with Router version 1.38.0 on 2024-01-19. More information about the Router’s External Coprocessing feature is available here.
When using Native Rust Plugins:
Instances of the Apollo Router running versions >=1.7.0 and <1.52.1 are impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability if all of the following are true:
- Router has been configured to use a custom-developed Native Rust Plugin
- The plugin accesses
Request.router_requestin theRouterServicelayer - You are accumulating the body from
Request.router_requestinto memory
To use a plugin, you need to be running a customized Router binary. Additionally, you need to have a plugins section with at least one plugin defined in your Router’s configuration YAML. That plugin would also need to define a custom router_service method.
You can check for a defined plugin by reviewing for the following in your Router’s configuration YAML:
...
plugins:
custom_plugin_name:
# custom config here
...
You can check for a custom router_service method in a plugin, by reviewing for the following function signature in your plugin’s source:
fn router_service(&self, service: router::BoxService) -> router::BoxService
More information about the Router’s Native Rust Plugin feature is available here.
Impact Detail
If using an impacted configuration, the Router will load entire HTTP request bodies into memory without respect to other HTTP request size-limiting configurations like limits.http_max_request_bytes. This can cause the Router to be out-of-memory (OOM) terminated if a sufficiently large request is sent to the Router.
By default, the Router sets limits.http_max_request_bytes to 2 MB. More information about the Router’s request limiting features is available here.
Patches
If you have an impacted configuration as defined above, please upgrade to at least Apollo Router 1.52.1.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, you can mitigate the denial-of-service opportunity impacting External Coprocessors by setting the coprocessor.router.request.body configuration option to false. Please note that changing this configuration option will change the information sent to any coprocessors you have configured and may impact functionality implemented by those coprocessors.
If you have developed a Native Rust Plugin and cannot upgrade, you can update your plugin to either not accumulate the request body or enforce a maximum body size limit.
You can also mitigate this issue by limiting HTTP body payload sizes prior to the Router (e.g., in a proxy or web application firewall appliance).
References
Apollo Router 1.52.1 Release Notes External Coprocessing documentation HTTP Request Limiting documentation Native Rust Plugin documentation
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | apollo-router | ≥ 1.7.0&&< 1.52.1 | 1.52.1 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for apollo-router. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update apollo-router to 1.52.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.