GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32
HIGHIncus container environment configuration newline injection
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/lxc/incus/v6Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A user with the ability to launch a container with a custom YAML configuration (e.g a member of the ‘incus’ group) can create an environment variable containing newlines, which can be used to add additional configuration items in the container’s lxc.conf due to the newline injection. This can allow adding arbitrary lifecycle hooks, ultimately resulting in arbitrary command execution on the host.
Details
When passing environment variables in the config block of a new container, values are not checked for the presence of newlines [1], which can result in newline injection inside the generated container lxc.conf. This can be used to set arbitrary additional configuration items, such as lxc.hook.pre-start. By exploiting this, a user with the ability to launch a container with an arbitrary config can achieve arbitrary command execution as root on the host.
Exploiting this issue on IncusOS requires a slight modification of the payload to change to a different writable directory for the validation step (e.g /tmp). This can be confirmed with a second container with /tmp mounted from the host (A privileged action for validation only).
[1] https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/HEAD/internal/server/instance/drivers/driver_lxc.go#L1081
PoC
A proof-of-concept script exploiting this vulnerability can be found attached, named environment_newline_injection.sh, showing arbitrary command execution, which will write a file to the root filesystem (/newline_injection_command_exec_poc)
Manual Reproduction steps:
- Launch a new container with a configuration file containing a multiline YAML string as an environment variable value, such as in the listing below.
- Observe that the lxc.conf (
/run/incus/user-1000_poc/lxc.confin my case) contains an additionallxc.hook.pre-startitem - Observe the creation of the file in the host root directory, with contents proving command execution as root.
incus launch images:alpine/edge --ephemeral poc << EOF
config:
environment.FOO: |-
abc
lxc.hook.pre-start = /bin/sh -c "id > /newline_injection_command_exec_poc"
EOF
Impact
A user with the ability to launch a container with a custom YAML configuration (e.g a member of the ‘incus’ group) can achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
Attachments
environment_newline_injection.sh environment_newline_injection.patch
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v6 | all versions | 6.21.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v6. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v6 to 6.21.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-x6jc-phwx-hp32 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.