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ApostropheCMS sanitize-html: nonTextTags discard region ends early on an implied close, letting <noscript> content renderGHSA-x3q4-9hxx-gx8m

Fix: apostrophecms/apostrophe@9500b8b

GHSA-x3q4-9hxx-gx8m is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in sanitize-html. A fix is available for sanitize-html — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-113654
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs27th percentile — riskier than 27% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

3Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
sanitize-htmlnpm
8.0Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

sanitize-html discards the content of every element in nonTextTags. It delimits that region using htmlparser2's close events, and ignores the isImplied flag htmlparser2 passes it. Closing a still-open ancestor from inside a <noscript> makes htmlparser2 unwind its stack past the noscript; the synthetic implied close it emits on the way ends the discard region early, and everything after it is treated as ordinary body content.

A browser with scripting enabled parses <noscript> content as raw text, so the same markup renders as inert text there. The sanitizer therefore emits elements the page itself would not have.

Reproduction

const sanitizeHtml = require("sanitize-html");

sanitizeHtml('<div><noscript></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif"></noscript>', {
  allowedTags: ["div", "img"],
  allowedAttributes: { img: ["src"] },
  nonTextTags: ["script", "style", "textarea", "option", "noscript"],
});
// => '<div></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif" />'

Chrome, given the same input, renders no <img> — the whole payload is raw text inside the unclosed <noscript>. Verified with Playwright, srcdoc into an iframe so the scripting flag is on.

A <![CDATA[ variant hides the opening tag from the parser entirely and has the same effect:

<p>Hi</p><![CDATA[ x > <noscript>]]><a href="…">Reset your password</a><img src="…beacon.gif"></noscript>

htmlparser2 runs a CDATA token to ]]>; Chrome ends a bogus comment at the first >, so the <noscript> after it is real to the browser and invisible to the parser.

Where the behaviour is

index.js:

  • :154 — nonTextTagsArray (the default list, ['script','style','textarea','option','xmp']).
  • :638 — onclosetag: function (name, isImplied) — receives the flag.
  • :644 — skipTextDepth-- — decrements without consulting isImplied.

Suggested fix

Do not end a discard region on an implied close. htmlparser2 already distinguishes them; the flag is passed and discarded. Something close to:

onclosetag: function (name, isImplied) {
  if (skipText) {
    if (isImplied) return;   // an implied close must not end the region
    skipTextDepth--;
    …

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmsanitize-htmlall versions2.18.0npm install sanitize-html@2.18.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sanitize-html, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update sanitize-html to 2.18.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x3q4-9hxx-gx8m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `sanitize-html` discards the *content* of every element in `nonTextTags`. It delimits that region using htmlparser2's close events, and ignores the `isImplied` flag htmlparser2 passes it. Closing a still-open **ancestor** from inside a `<noscript>` makes htmlparser2 unwind its stack past the `noscript`; the synthetic implied close it emits on the way ends the discard region early, and everything after it is treated as ordinary body content. A browser with scripting enabled parses `<noscript>` content as **raw text**, so the same markup renders as inert text there. The sanitizer th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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