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HIGH severity

Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeoverGHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2

HIGHFix: ontola/atomic-server@457c1dc

GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.7) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in atomic-server. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Also known asCVE-2026-69155
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀atomic-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Files uploaded via POST /upload are served back by GET /download/{path} using actix_files::NamedFile. For text/html and image/svg+xml, actix-files (0.6.6) sets Content-Disposition: inline, so the browser renders the file instead of downloading it. The /download route sets no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and no forced attachment (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the same origin as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads evil.html containing <script>; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the atomic_session cookie is set via document.cookie (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts), the script exfiltrates the private key → permanent account takeover.

Affected component

  • server/src/handlers/upload.rs — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.
  • server/src/handlers/download.rs:65 — NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req) with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.

  1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):
POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 <ms>")>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----poc

------poc
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="assets"; filename="xss.html"
Content-Type: text/html

<html><body><script>alert(document.domain)</script>STORED-XSS-PROOF</body></html>
------poc--

Response 200 returns a downloadURL, e.g. http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html.

  1. Inspect how the server serves it:
$ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
content-disposition: inline; filename="<ts>-xss.html"
# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)

text/html + inline + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. image/svg+xml behaves identically.

  1. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads document.cookie (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.

Expected: user files served with Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff, or from an isolated origin. Actual: served inline, text/html, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes.

(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact <script> body. In-browser execution and IndexedDB key theft follow directly from these response headers.)

Impact

Stored XSS in the app origin → theft of the victim's session cookie (not HttpOnly) and Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → permanent account takeover (not limited by the 10-second token window). If the victim is an admin/root Agent, this is server takeover.

Remediation

  • On /download, force Content-Disposition: attachment for user files, add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and a sandbox CSP.
  • Serve user-uploaded files from a separate origin/subdomain.
  • Set HttpOnly + Secure on the session cookie; do not persist the private key in JS-readable storage.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioatomic-server≥ 0.30.0No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for atomic-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of atomic-server for GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `<script>`; when a victim opens the link, the s
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline…