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GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp

HIGH

Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service

Also known asCVE-2026-25791GO-2026-4466
Published
Feb 6, 2026
Updated
Feb 19, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk32th percentile+0.38%
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.91%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/bishopfox/sliver

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated TOTP bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when EnforceOTP is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.

Vulnerable Component

  • server/c2/dns.go:84-90 (EnforceOTP stored but not enforced in bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:378-390 (TOTP requests routed directly to bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:490-521 (handleHello allocates session without OTP validation)
  • server/c2/dns.go:495 (sessions.Store with no lifecycle control in this path)
  • client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52 (operator-facing EnforceOTP control implies auth gate)
  • implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900 (otpMsg sends TOTP with ID=0)
  • protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22 (documents TOTP in ID field)

Attack Vector

  • Network-accessible DNS listener
  • No authentication required
  • Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop
  • Trigger path: DNSMessageType_TOTP bootstrap handling

Proof of Concept

Preconditions

  • DNS listener is reachable
  • DNS C2 job is active

Reproduction Steps

  1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type TOTP.
  2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.
  3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.

Example

while true; do
  dig +short @<DNS_C2_IP> baa8.<parent-domain> A >/dev/null
done

baa8 is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.

Observable Indicators

  • Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from handleHello
  • Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process
  • Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume

Impact

  • Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)
  • Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path
  • Estimated CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5 High)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/bishopfox/sliverall versions1.6.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/bishopfox/sliver. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/bishopfox/sliver to 1.6.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated `TOTP` bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when `EnforceOTP` is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion. ## Vulnerable Component - `server/c2/dns.go:84-90` (`EnforceOTP` stored but not enforced in bootstrap) - `server/c2/dns.go:378-390` (`TOTP` requests routed directly to bootstrap) - `server/c2/dns.go:490-521` (`handleHello` allocates session without
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.