GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx
HIGHUnsafe plugins can be installed via pack import by tenant admins
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
Unsafe plugins (for instance sql-list) can be installed in subdomain tenants via pack import even if unsafe plugin installation for tenants is disables
Details
I have an example https://bot20230704.saltcorn.com/view/all_plugins It's publicly accessible (but has not so secure values except list of tenants). But using this mech one can read any data from other tenants.
Impact
All tenants of installation (i.e. saltcorn.com), can be compromised from tenant user has admin access. If an untrusted user has admin rights to a tenant instance, they will be able to install a plug-in that can access information from other tenants
Revived after 0.8.7
After patch in 0.8.7 this is not fixed completely.
Here are steps to reproduce:
- Publish to NPM plugin that was not approved by admin (in case of saltcorn.com) by @glutamate. I've just published this one: https://www.npmjs.com/package/saltcorn-qrcode
- Publish somewhere plugin store that includes plugin from previous step: https://gist.github.com/pyhedgehog/f1fd7cb13f4d0a7ccf6a965748d19bd2
- Add plugin store link to tenant store.
- Install plugin.
- Use it in tenant: https://bot20230704.saltcorn.com/view/testqr_show/1
Here are logic: Unsafe plugins checked against this list: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/99fe277e497fd193bb070acd8c663aa254a9907c/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L191 But it's under control of tenant admin, not server admin. Proposed login:
const safes = getRootState().getConfig("available_plugins",[]).filter(p=>!p.unsafe).map(p=>p.location);
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @saltcorn/cli | all versions | 0.8.8-beta.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @saltcorn/cli. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @saltcorn/cli to 0.8.8-beta.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wxf3-4fvj-vqqx across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.