How severe is GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47?

GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 affects the following packages: skillctl (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47?

Update skillctl to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for skillctl. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 was published on June 5, 2026 and was last updated on June 19, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47

Fix: umanio-agency/skillctl@827fff5

GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is a remote code execution vulnerability in skillctl. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion

Published

Jun 5, 2026

Updated

Jun 19, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Jun 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🦀skillctl

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

skillctl 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to:

Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials). The symlink fell through entry.file_type().is_dir() in fs_util::copy_dir_all, was dereferenced by fs::copy, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent skillctl push would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called "round-trip path exfiltration".
Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root by crafting a .skills.toml with a malicious destination or source_path field. Both were deserialized as PathBuf with zero validation. Because Path::join lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, destination = "/home/user/.ssh" made cwd.join(...) resolve outside the project; .. traversal was equally unguarded. Downstream remove_dir_all in replace_folder_contents then wiped arbitrary writable directories on skillctl pull / push / detect. .skills.toml is the exact kind of file teams commit and exchange via PR; a single merged malicious PR was sufficient to weaponise the maintainer's next skillctl pull --all.
detect --target accepted .. traversal, even though absolute paths were rejected. --target ../../../etc would have written outside the library root.
Fork-name validation accepted . and .. literally, so a fork named .. would have produced a Path::join resolving to the parent directory and fs::rename could have clobbered it.

Patches

Fixed in v0.1.2:

Symlinks inside skill folders are hard-rejected at copy time (both top-level source and any descendant entry).
.skills.toml destination and source_path are validated at load time and reject absolute paths, .. components, and Windows-prefix components.
A new path_safety::safe_join helper is wired (defense-in-depth) at every destructive call site in pull.rs / push.rs.
detect --target and the interactive custom-path prompt go through the same validate_relative_subpath helper.
validate_fork_name explicitly rejects . and ...

Threat-model note: the fix is purely lexical (component-level) plus an explicit symlink check at copy time. No filesystem canonicalize calls were added, avoiding TOCTOU windows.

Credit

Reported privately on 2026-05-19 by firebaguette via the Umanio Discord (the reporter declined GitHub credit, so this advisory carries no structured credits field).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`skillctl`	all versions	0.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for skillctl. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update skillctl to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact `skillctl` 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to: 1. **Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine** by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. `niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials`). The symlink fell through `entry.file_type().is_dir()` in `fs_util::copy_dir_all`, was dereferenced by `fs::copy`, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent `skillctl push` would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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