GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh
GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh is a security vulnerability in neotoma. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
neotoma has tenant isolation gap in relationship query endpoints
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
neotomanpmDescription
Summary
The /list_relationships and /retrieve_graph_neighborhood endpoints call getAuthenticatedUserId (confirming a valid session exists) but do not pass the resolved user ID into the Supabase query as an .eq("user_id", userId) filter. As a result, queries return rows from all users rather than scoping to the authenticated caller's data.
Affected code
/list_relationships (src/actions.ts):
- Calls
getAuthenticatedUserIdbut does not apply.eq("user_id", userId)to the relationships query - Uses
.or()string interpolation for entity ID matching without input validation
/retrieve_graph_neighborhood (src/actions.ts):
- Same pattern: auth resolved, user ID not applied to query filter
Affected versions
v0.13.0
Prerequisites
- A valid authentication token for the Neotoma instance (attacker must have a legitimate account on the same instance)
- A known entity ID belonging to another user (~96 bits of entropy — brute-force not practical)
An unauthenticated caller is rejected at the auth middleware layer. The gap requires a second user account on the instance.
Impact
An authenticated user with a known cross-user entity ID can retrieve relationship edges and graph neighborhood data belonging to another user. No write capability is exposed.
Severity
Low under current conditions — no multi-tenant deployments exist. Escalates to Medium the moment two or more user accounts share an instance.
Remediation
- Add
.eq("user_id", userId)to all Supabase queries in both handlers - Validate entity ID inputs with
isNeotomaEntityIdbefore query construction - Replace
.or()string interpolation with separate scoped.eq()calls
Fix tracked in #365 (list_relationships) and #366 (retrieve_graph_neighborhood). Gate gap tracked in #372.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | neotoma | ≥ 0.13.0&&< 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for neotoma. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update neotoma to 0.14.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.